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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Affirmative action remains controversial in American jurisprudence 
and society in general.1  Corporate policies, governmental programs and 
judicial decisions merely touching on minority preferences generate 
scathing media editorials and public outcry.2  The pro-affirmative action 
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       1.   See, e.g., Laurel Rosenberg, Grutter v. Bollinger:  Setting a Path for Diversity at 
the University of South Carolina School of Law, 55 S.C. L. REV. 531, 531 (Spring 2004) 
(“[Affirmative action] is one of the most controversial topics that the United States Supreme 
Court has addressed in recent years.”); Stylianos-Ioannis G. Koutnatzis, Affirmative Action 
in Education:  The Trust and Honesty Perspective, 7 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 187, 189 (Fall 
2002) (beginning the article with the sentence:  “Affirmative action is one of the most 
controversial topics for constitutional scholars, perhaps for American society at large as 
well”). 
 2. See, e.g., Students Outraged by Bush Attack on Affirmative Action, IN MOTION 
MAGAZINE, http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/idaa/rebush.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009) 
(discussing the George W. Bush administration’s decision to challenge the University of 
Michigan’s undergraduate and law school affirmative action policies); Ethan Bronner, 
Conservatives Open Drive Against Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, available 
at 
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camp accuses opponents of holding back minority advancement.  They 
argue that this is especially problematic in a world where lawful 
discrimination drastically impeded certain groups for centuries.  Proponents 
also argue that prejudice lingers—consciously and subconsciously—in 
contemporary society.3  The anti-affirmative action camp counters with 
warnings about the destruction of the meritocracy that makes America 
great.4  Opponents also argue that a stamp of inferiority is placed on 
minorities collectively when affirmative action benefits minorities 
individually.  Strong voices on either side continue to shoot down workable 
solutions designed to facilitate equitable minority advancement.5 
The United States Supreme Court—an institution capable of shining a 
bright and guiding light on issues of equal protection and individual 
rights—continually fails to provide clarity in the arena of minority 
preferences.  The Court’s most prominent affirmative action opinions:  (1) 
rarely gain large majorities (or any majority at all), (2) tend to alter 
principles from previous precedent or muddy understanding through dicta 
and (3) fail to articulate workable, somewhat standardized tests to evaluate 
minority preference plans.  This leaves governments, educational 
institutions, and private employers to struggle with this confusing “line” of 
precedent as they make contracting, employment, and admissions decisions 
in real time.  All of this occurs in an economy where every contract, job, 
and admission is a precious commodity. 
This article moves away from heavily analyzed affirmative action 
programs in higher education, public employment, and government 
contracting and instead frames the looming battlefield:  diversity-based, 
non-remedial, voluntary preference programs created by private 
 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D02EEDA1539F935A15752C0A96F9582
60 (discussing an advertising campaign with the headline:  “On 15 campuses across the 
country, students will open their college newspapers today to a full-page advertisement with 
the headline: ‘Guilty by Admission’ and, in bold print, ‘Nearly Every Elite College in 
America Violates the Law. Does Yours?’”). 
 3. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green and Alexandra Kalev, Symposium:  Discrimination-
Reducing Measures at the Relational Level, 59  HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1435 (June 2008) 
(discussing conscious and subconscious discrimination in the workplace and stating that 
social science research “has revealed that discriminatory biases and reliance on stereotypes 
in the workplace are not always conscious or motivated by animus”). 
 4. See generally, THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD:  AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY, Yale University Press (2004) (examining the effects of affirmation action 
in other countries); Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM & MARY L. 
REV. 33 (Fall 1992) (arguing against affirmative action). 
 5. See, e.g., Charles Kels, Finding a Middle Ground on Affirmative Action, DAILY 
PENNSYLVANIAN, Mar. 28, 2003, available at 
http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/2003/03/28/Opini
on/Charles.Kels.Finding.A.Middle.Ground.On.Affirmative.Action-2154945.shtml (“Like 
most controversial issues from abortion to gun control, the affirmative action debate has 
unfortunately been controlled by the extreme positions on either side.”). 
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employers.6  Structured as such, corporate affirmative action plans of the 
future will differ from historical efforts.  In the past, minority preferences 
sought to remedy proven workplace discrimination or documented societal 
discrimination in particular job categories – a backward-looking rationale.  
The contemporary rationale is more forward-looking and shines the 
spotlight directly on workforce diversity for its own sake.  Employer-
proponents of such plans argue that diversity focused efforts are necessary 
to compete, market, innovate, think, and profit in today’s global 
marketplace.  Accordingly, this article distinguishes the Remedial 
Rationale of the past with the Diversity Spotlight Rationale of the future.7 
More specifically, Part II defines workplace affirmative action, 
examines its historical roots and then synthesizes relevant precedent from 
the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts.  Part III evaluates the 
Diversity Spotlight Rationale and three key components required for 
diversity-based plans to comply with such precedent.  This analysis is 
informed by the recent Grutter v. Bollinger decision, where prominent 
private employers filed amici curiae briefs favoring diversity-based 
affirmative action at the University of Michigan’s law school.8  Part IV 
anticipates a potential Supreme Court case squarely confronting this topic 
and discusses the likely decision in light of precedent from Part I and 
current composition of the Supreme Court.9  This part argues that the 
Diversity Spotlight Rationale—outside of the higher education realm—is 
likely at odds with the prior opinions of at least five Justices on a 
conservative-leaning Court.  These facts lead to the prediction that private 
employers will have a difficult time implementing voluntary affirmative 
action plans without resorting to the Remedial Rationale and conceding 
prior institutional or societal discrimination in relevant job categories.  Part 
V concludes with a summary of this new frontier and posits that the 
controversy will continue even after the next prominent affirmative action 
 
 6. The relevant companies in this article are those governed by Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2000).  Generally, Title VII covers 
employers, engaged in an industry affecting commerce, employing fifteen or more 
employees for at least a specific period of time.  § 2000e(b) (Title VII also covers federal, 
state and local governments as well as employment agencies and labor unions; however, 
such covered entities are not covered in this article). 
 7. Spotlights are designed to call attention to a subject or make something more 
prevalent.  See, e.g., DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spotlight 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (defining spotlight as “a strong, focused light thrown upon a 
particular spot . . . . for making some object, person, or group especially conspicuous.”).  
This analogy is appropriate in the case of forward-looking, voluntary affirmative action 
plans by employers who call attention to diversity aspects involving their workforces. 
 8. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 9. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; see also United Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO-
CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 
(1987) (examples of landmark affirmative action precedents). 
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II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PRIVATE WORKPLACES, ITS HISTORY & 
GOVERNING PRECEDENT 
Affirmative action seeks to temporarily increase employment, 
educational, and societal opportunities for qualified members of 
underrepresented groups.10  Historically, affirmative action focused on 
helping black citizens overcome the effects of prior discrimination and 
segregation.  Early plans attacked racial barriers obstructing employment 
opportunities11 and contract rights.12  This approach was colorblind and 
required employers to subtract an individual’s race from the decision-
 
 10. For a similar definition of affirmative action see Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using 
the Master’s “Tool” to Dismantle His House:  Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the 
Case For Affirmative Action.  47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 114 n.2 (Spring 2005); see also 
Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholders, and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 120 n.3 
(2003) (defining affirmative action as “minority-mindfulness in decision-making resulting 
in either a preference or a disproportionate distribution of benefits.”); Martha S. West, The 
Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 614 (1998) (defining 
affirmative action similarly by stating that “affirmative action has come to mean any type of 
program or policy where race, national origin, or gender is taken into account. To be eligible 
for the benefits of affirmative action in employment, a person must meet two requirements:  
[1] The person must be a member of a group that has been historically underrepresented . . .  
and [2] the person must be otherwise qualified . . .”).  Professor William W. Van Alstyne 
delves more deeply into the many different aspects and definitions of affirmative action in a 
recent article.  Affirmative Actions, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1517 (Fall 2000).  The term 
affirmative action comes from the labor-management relations arena where “employers 
found guilty of unfair labor practices regarding employee attempts to organize could be 
required take steps to assure a work environment free of threats against future employee 
organizing activities.”  See, e.g., COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, A REPORT OF THE STUDY 
GROUP ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-L, at 30 (Aug. 1987) [hereinafter H.R. 
DOC. NO. 110-L]. 
 11. See, e.g., Corrine E. Anderson, Comment:  A Current Perspective:  The Erosion of 
Affirmative Action in University Admissions, 32 AKRON L. REV. 181, 185-91 [hereinafter 
Current Perspective] (discussing the impetus behind the Fourteenth Amendment and stating 
that “African Americans were the intended beneficiaries of the earliest forms of affirmative 
action.”).  See generally Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and 
the Interpretation of its Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291 
(Winter 1996) [hereinafter Historical Review] (discussing the history of affirmative action 
in depth). 
 12. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) [hereinafter Section 1981] ( “[A]ll persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”).  This section 
was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and, although it has been amended, is still a major 
weapon against discrimination.  See, e.g., Danielle Tarantolo, From Employment to 
Contract:  Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor 
Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 184 (2006) ( “Section 1981’s ‘make and enforce contracts’ 
clause has played an active role in modern anti-discrimination law”). 
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making equation.  Over time, the efficacy of purely colorblind affirmative 
action was questioned and plans morphed into color-conscious minority 
preferences.13  Although these preference-based plans often excluded Asian 
Americans, they brought other underrepresented groups—such as Native 
Americans, Hispanics and females—under the umbrella.14  In the 1960s and 
1970s, preference-based affirmative action gained traction and spread into 
different areas of American life and commerce.15  As a result, today’s 
affirmative action plans are created, or judicially imposed, in the following 
five arenas:  (1) government contracting,16 (2) public education,17 (3) 
 
 13. See, e.g., JOHN DAVID SKRETNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:  POLITICS, 
CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 80-81 (1996) (discussing the earliest forms of 
affirmative action and stating that when President Lyndon Johnson assumed power “he 
continued Kennedy’s . . .  color-blind course.  His tenure began with two major initiatives, 
both designed to protect Americans regardless of race.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Current Perspective, supra note 11, at 190 (discussing how the first 
Executive Orders requiring affirmative action in government contracting banned 
discrimination based on race and other categories such as creed and national origin); 
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 619 (analyzing an affirmative action plan intended to benefit particular 
minority groups and women). 
 15. See e.g., Harvey Gee, Guest Commentary. Asian-Americans and Affirmative Action, 
DENV. POST, May 7, 2008, available at http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_9172477 
(stating that: 
“It is apparent that under the guidelines of these [affirmative action] programs, 
Asian Americans are not seen as sufficiently disadvantaged or under-
represented to warrant the same consideration offered to African Americans and 
Latinos. The virtual absence of Asian Americans from affirmative action 
analysis is troubling and demonstrates the need for the Asian American voice to 
be heard.  This tendency to exclude Asian Americans from the affirmative 
action debate is disingenuous. Perhaps it is reflective of the erroneous belief that 
Asian Americans do not or should not benefit from affirmative action.”);  
see also Christopher Marquis, Woman in the News; A Washington Veteran for Labor; 
A Tested Negotiator for Trade; Elaine Lan Chao, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, at A-17 
(quoting former Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao who stated: 
“[that Asian-Americans] have also been tremendously damaged by affirmative 
action. . . . Many Asian-Americans are excluded from minority procurement 
programs [and] are not considered to be minorities in the full sense of the word 
– positive and negative – and quota systems in the best universities in this land 
exclude qualified Asian-Americans."). 
 16. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204-10 (1995) (dealing 
with affirmative action efforts by the federal government intended to encourage government 
contractors to subcontract with small businesses controlled by “socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78 
(1989) (dealing with affirmative action efforts by a city government whereby “prime 
contractors to whom the city awarded construction contracts [were required] to subcontract 
at least 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to one or more Minority Business 
Enterprises . . . [defined as businesses at least fifty-one percent] owned and controlled . . . 
by minority group members . . . [such as] Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, 
Eskimos, or Aleuts”);  see also Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. 
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organized labor,18 (4) public employment,19 and (5) private employment.20 
The remainder of Part II is divided into two sections.  The first focuses 
on the history of color-conscious, preference-based affirmative action in 
the private employment arena.  The second section analyzes the line of 
precedent formed from legal challenges to such employer preference 
programs.  This discussion provides the historical and legal background 
necessary for Part III and the key components of private, voluntary 
affirmative action plans created under the Diversity Spotlight rationale. 
A. The Emergence of Preference-Based Affirmative Action in the Private 
Employment Arena 
In 1954, the Supreme Court declared that government-sanctioned, 
separate but equal treatment according to race is unconstitutional.21   Acting 
on this mandate, the federal government experimented with ideas to 
ameliorate racial tensions persisting after Brown v. Board of Education.  
Modern affirmative action was born out of such efforts.22  The American 
 
Nev. 1979) (discussing an affirmative action plan voluntarily created to comply with 
Executive Order 11246 in contract dealings with the Atomic Energy Commission). 
 17. Oftentimes affirmative action plans public education at the undergraduate and 
graduate levels.  See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312-16 (analyzing an affirmative action plan 
created by the law school at a public university to benefit “racial and ethnic diversity with 
special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically 
discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who 
without this commitment might not be represented in [Michigan Law School’s] student 
body in meaningful numbers”); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-73 (2003) (discussing 
an affirmative action plan created by a public university for its undergraduate College of 
Literature, Science, and the Arts designed to benefit blacks, Hispanics and Native 
Americans).  In some situations, affirmative action plans also target kindergarten through 
high school education.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701 (2007) (discussing two separate affirmative action plans – public elementary 
school assignments in Louisville, Kentucky and public high school assignments in Seattle, 
Washington). 
 18. See, e.g., Breschard v. Dir. Guild of Am., 1984 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19766, at 4-5 (C.D. 
Cal. 1984) (discussing Directors Guild of America and its attempts to create affirmative 
action plans to combat a “history of discrimination against its women and racial minority 
members by . . . . production companies”). 
 19. See, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 
1996) (analyzing an affirmative action plan at a public high school using Title VII as a 
guide). 
 20. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-200 (analyzing an affirmative action plan created 
by a private employer as part of a collective bargaining agreement intended to benefit black 
craft workers); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 623-27 (analyzing an affirmative action plan under 
Title VII created to benefit women and minorities who had been underrepresented in major 
job classifications). 
 21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 22. See, e.g., Richard N. Appel, Alison L. Gray, and Nilufer Loy, The 40th Anniversary 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Symposium:  Affirmative Action in the 
CIOCCHETTIFINALIZED_ONE 3/31/2010  1:59:33 AM 
2010] FRONTIER OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 289 
 
workplace—with its historically discriminatory practices23—became one of 
the government’s initial targets.24 
In 1961, President Kennedy issued an Executive Order which focused 
the attention of the Executive Branch on discrimination in employment.  
Executive Order 10925 codified a concept labeled “affirmative action”25 
which prohibited discrimination by companies contracting with the federal 
government against any “employee or applicant for employment.”  This 
legally enforceable presidential decree required that such contractors’ 
employment decisions be made without regard to race, creed, color, 
religion or national origin.26  President Kennedy did not mandate that 
 
Workplace:  Forty Years Later, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 549, 551-52 (Spring 2005) 
[hereinafter 40th Anniversary] (“[Although the] concept of legislating equal employment in 
the private sector may be traced back to various constitutional amendments, Reconstruction, 
and New Deal Era legislation, the modern day concept of affirmative action evolved from 
the social unrest of the 1950s. During that decade, race relations became a societal flash 
point, leading to the reexamination of state sponsored segregation in Brown v. Board of 
Education . . .  Although the actual process of desegregation stretched out for decades, the 
Brown cases paved the way for broader social reform.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
 23. See, e.g., Michael L. Foreman, Kristin M. Dadey, and Audrey J. Wiggins, The 
Continuing Relevance of Race-Conscious Remedies and Programs in Integrating the 
Nation’s Workforce, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 81, 83 (collecting cases and stating that 
in the “period following the passage of Title VII, a number of lawsuits were filed in an 
effort to dismantle the kind of systemic discrimination that was deeply ingrained in the 
American workplace.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Historical Review, supra note 11, at 301-02 (discussing the fact that 
discrimination in employment continued well beyond the Brown decision and the attempts 
made by government to end such discrimination). 
 25. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1961), [hereinafter E.O. 10925] 
(establishing the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity).  This order did 
not lay out any steps that such affirmative action plans should take.  See, e.g., 40th 
Anniversary, supra note 22, at 552-53.  This Executive Order was superseded by Executive 
Order 11246, discussed below; however, Executive Order 10925 remains important for its 
historical significance.  See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Executive Orders 
Disposition Tables, President John F. Kennedy, available at 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/1961-kennedy.html. 
 26. E.O. 10925 (declaring that government contractors “will not discriminate against 
any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin . 
. . [and] will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that 
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or 
national origin.”).  Interestingly, under Executive Order 10925, religion was a protected 
class only in the government employment category and not in the subcontractor employment 
category and creed was a protected class only in the subcontractor employment category.  
Compare E.O. 10925, Part II – Nondiscrimination in Government Employment (prohibiting 
discrimination against “any employee or applicant for employment in the Federal 
Government because of race, color, religion, or national origin”) with E.O. 10925, Part III – 
Obligations of Government Contractors and Subcontractors (“[C]ontractors will not 
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, 
color or national origin”). 
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contractors grant preferences to minorities.  From the perspective of 
affirmative action, Executive Order 10925 declared only that employment 
decisions be made free from any consideration of race or color – in other 
words, such decisions had to be colorblind. 
Congress incorporated the colorblind thrust of this and subsequent 
Executive Orders27 into its most significant piece of civil rights legislation 
since 1866.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196428 made it illegal for a 
covered employer29 to: 
[F]ail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.”30 
 
 27. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, Part II, Subpart B – 
Contractors Agreement, § 202 (1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/ofccp/regs/statutes/eo11246.htm (currently requiring, 
among other things, a government contractor to create an affirmative action program and to 
provide a written affirmation that it “will not discriminate against any employee or applicant 
for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . [and] take 
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated 
during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin”); 
Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985, § 1 (1969), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (1994), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/eo11478/eo11478.html (“[It is] 
the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal opportunity in Federal 
employment for all persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment because of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, or age, and to promote the full realization of 
equal employment opportunity through a continuing affirmative program in each executive 
department and agency.”); Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980), reprinted 
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/byagency/eo12250.php (attempting to eliminate discrimination 
in federal programs and programs receiving federal funds); Exec. Order No. 12,259, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 1,253, § 1-602 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994), available at 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12259.html (requiring 
consistency from federal agencies in implementing Executive Order 12,250). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).  See also Historical Review, supra note 11, at 303-07 
(“Congress strengthened Executive Order 10,925 by incorporating it into Titles VI and VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby providing the legislative basis for equal 
employment opportunity laws and affirmative action programs.  The United States Senate 
explicitly noted that the Act included the affirmative action program set forth in Executive 
Order 10,925 in the administration provisions of Title VII.”) (citations omitted). 
 29. Under Title VII the term "employer" means “a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.”  42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(b). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  In addition, Title VII makes it unlawful for a covered 
employer to: 
[L]imit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
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A subsequent section of Title VII dealt more specifically with 
affirmative action and declared: 
Nothing [in Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any 
employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or 
to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance 
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of 
persons  . . . in comparison with the total number or percentage of 
persons . . . in any community . . . or in the available work 
force.31 
These operative provisions, strictly interpreted, broadly ban 
discrimination against individuals with protected status (i.e., race, color, 
religion, sex and national origin) in covered workplaces.  Through its 
express language, Title VII disincentivizes employers from implementing 
affirmative action programs that preference minority groups and inherently 
discriminate against whites “because of” race.  In fact, the only express 
approval of affirmative action in the statute allows a court to implement 
preferences as a remedy only after making a determination that a covered 
employer has “intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an 
unlawful employment practice.”32  In such situations, a “court may enjoin 
[an employer] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and 
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.”33 
Opponents of affirmative action quickly claimed that Title VII’s 
colorblind provisions—working in tandem—banned all minority 
preference plans voluntarily created by private employers.34  Proponents of 
 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).  See also Historical Review, supra note 11, at 309 
(“Nothing in the federal statutes requires a private firm to incorporate affirmative action 
programs into its employment strategy. The private sector can only be required to undertake 
affirmative action when ordered by a court, upon a finding that the employer engaged in 
intentional discrimination.”). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).  See also H.R. DOC. NO. 110-L, supra note 10, at 37 
(“[Courts have] ordered employers to hire or promote equal numbers of minority and non-
minority employees up to a certain percentage of the workforce . . . [and] ordered public and 
private employers to adopt special recruitment and testing policies designed to assure 
opportunities for minorities and women to compete [for] jobs.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that: 
With a clarity which, had it not proven so unavailing, one might well 
recommend as a model of statutory draftsmanship, Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 declares that it “shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer:  (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
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affirmative action staked their claim to the fact that the express language of 
Title VII does not expressly forbid voluntary affirmative action plans and 
that its legislative history actually encourages precisely this type of 
minority assistance.35 
Adding to the confusion was the fact that—while the statute is clear in 
its anti-discrimination mandate—Title VII does not specify the elements of 
discriminatory conduct.  This omission left the primary interpretation to the 
court system.  Judicial decisions interpreting Title VII soon created a 
bifurcated liability structure for employers accused of discrimination.  
Under these interpretations, Title VII prohibits both (1) intentional 
discrimination (disparate treatment)36 and (2) unintentional discrimination 
caused by company decisions which are facially neutral but have a 
discriminatory impact (disparate impact).37  Facing decades of historical 
discrimination and confronted with an expanding liability structure 
punishing such practices, employers struggled to make amends.  When 
 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .”  The Court today 
completes the process of converting this from a guarantee that race or sex will 
not be the basis for employment determinations, to a guarantee that it often 
will.) 
 35. See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that: 
The logic of antidiscrimination legislation requires that judicial constructions of 
Title VII leave "breathing room" for employer initiatives to benefit members of 
minority groups. If Title VII had never been enacted, a private employer would 
be free to hire members of minority groups for any reason that might seem 
sensible from a business or a social point of view. The Court's opinion in Weber 
reflects the same approach; the opinion relied heavily on legislative history 
indicating that Congress intended that traditional management prerogatives be 
left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible (citations omitted)). 
 36. Plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination generally prove a Title VII violation in 
one of two ways:  (1) direct evidence of intentional discrimination and (2) circumstantial 
evidence of intentional discrimination.   See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 
U.S. 111 (1985) (analyzing a case of alleged intentional discrimination under the direct 
evidence standard); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) 
(analyzing alleged intentional discrimination and creating a prima facie case for instances of 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination); Thomas A. Cunniff, Note, The Price of Equal 
Opportunity:  The Efficiency of Title VII After Hicks, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 507, 525-26 
(Winter 1995) (discussing the creation of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case and 
stating that this “formulation was entirely new, and the Court neither cited to any of the 
lower court cases nor to the earlier jury discrimination cases for support.”). 
 37. The Supreme Court addressed the disparate impact type of discrimination in the 
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (analyzing a facially neutral 
employment requirements—such as obtaining a high school diploma and passing scores on 
standardized tests—and stating that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but 
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is 
business necessity.  If an employment practice which operates to exclude [employees due to 
race] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”). 
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considering an affirmative action-type program, executives had to make 
sense of the explicit provisions of Title VII urging colorblind decision-
making and the statute’s seemingly contradictory mandate to eliminate the 
vestiges of prior discrimination.  As it did in 1961, the Executive Branch 
attempted clarification by attempting to legitimize a different type of 
affirmative action – this time in the form of minority preference programs 
instead of colorblindness. 
In 1970, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs 
(OFCCP) began to encourage a preference-based approach to affirmative 
action.  The OFCCP initiated enforcement programs which required private 
employers to “implement numerical goals and timetables” for minority 
advancement.38  Around the same time, the Department of Justice began to 
seek preference-based “affirmative action-type remedies in employment 
discrimination cases, including numerical goals and timetables.”39  Finally, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) applied pressure 
to companies and advocated for the implementation of preference-based 
affirmative action plans.40  Through its newly-created National Programs 
Division, the EEOC initiated investigations into major American 
companies, such as IBM and Sears,41 attempting to increase hiring of 
minorities and women.42  In addition, segments of the public were 
encouraged by advocacy groups to bring pressure—via community 
boycotts and reciprocal trade agreements—to spur companies to voluntarily 
create affirmative action plans.43 
Employers desiring to implement affirmative action to remedy past 
wrongs could find some comfort in the express governmental approval of 
preference-based plans.  However, the government failed to provide much 
guidance on the limits, proper context and valid structure of such plans.  
 
 38. Affirmative Action Programs, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (2004) (“[A] contractor’s 
[affirmative action] program shall provide in detail for specific steps to guarantee equal 
employment opportunity keyed to the problems and needs of members of minority groups, 
including, when there are deficiencies, the development of specific goals and time tables for 
the prompt achievement of full and equal employment opportunity.”).  See also 40th 
Anniversary, supra note 22, at 553. 
 39. 40th Anniversary, supra note 22, at 553 (collecting cases). 
 40. See H.R. DOC. NO.110-L, supra note 10, at 38. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (stating that the EEOC made the assumption that, considering its limited 
resources, “economies of scale would be achieved by focusing major staff resources on a 
few large firms in the hope that success with them would encourage other firms voluntarily 
to strengthen their affirmative action policies.”).  This pressure had limited short-term 
effectiveness.  Id. (stating that the EEOC’s strategy was “not entirely successful” and that it 
resulted in long legal battles with little changes in affirmative action policies). 
 43. Id. at 38-39 (stating that private organizations used “community based support to 
persuade public and private employers to adopt affirmative action measures beneficial to 
minorities and women.”). 
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The EEOC attempted clarification in 1979 via guidelines designed to walk 
employers through the creation of voluntary affirmative action plans.44  
These guidelines pronounced the agency’s opinion that Title VII was not 
intended to expose employers to reverse discrimination liability based on 
the implementation of preference-based affirmative action.45  Accordingly, 
the guidelines stated that voluntary affirmative action might be taken when: 
 
(1) an analysis reveals that existing or contemplated employment 
practices are likely to cause an actual or potential adverse impact; 
(2) a comparison between the employer's workforce and the 
appropriate labor pool reveals that it is necessary to correct the 
effects of prior discriminatory practices; and (3) a limited labor 
pool of qualified minorities and women for employment or 
promotional opportunities exists due to historical restrictions by 
employers, labor organizations, or others.46 
Employers who implement preference plans under these guidelines 
must:  (1) conduct a reasonable self-analysis of current employment 
practices, (2) have a reasonable basis for concluding that action is 
appropriate, and (3) take reasonable action.47  If employers use good faith 
in attempting to meet these criteria then they can claim a safe harbor for 
their affirmative action programs – at least according to the EEOC.48 
At the end of the day, however, merely having EEOC guidance has 
not proven extremely comforting to private employers.  In fact, companies 
operating under Title VII, the various Executive Orders, OFCCP and 
Department of Justice guidance and/or the EEOC guidelines remain leery 
as they were in the 1960s.  On one hand, employers realize that 
discrimination and the effects of prior discrimination persist in the 
workplace and that they are potentially liable for each and every 
 
 44. Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, As 
Amended, 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (2004). 
 45. Statement of Purpose, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (2004) (“Voluntary affirmative action to 
improve opportunities for minorities and women must be encouraged and protected in order 
to carry out the Congressional intent embodied in title VII.”). 
 46. Circumstances under which Affirmative Action is Appropriate, 29 C.F.R. § 
1608.3(a)-(c) (2004). 
 47. Establish Affirmative Action Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4 (2004). 
 48. See Standard of Review, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.10(b) (2004) (stating that, if an employer 
claims it relied on an affirmative action plan, the EEOC will determine if an employer’s 
reliance on such plan is true); id. at 1608.2 (stating that, if an employer’s affirmative action 
plan complies with the EEOC guidelines, the EEOC will issue a no-cause determination in 
response to a discrimination charge); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)(1) (stating that Title 
VII liability will not result from an employer’s good faith reliance on any written 
interpretation or opinion of the EEOC).  It is important to note that these guidelines 
specially allow affirmative action under the Remedial Rationale and seemingly not under 
the Diversity Spotlight Rationale – a topic reserved for Part IV. 
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employment decision they make.  On the other hand, employers understand 
the simple, non-discriminatory language of Title VII and the potential for 
reverse discrimination lawsuits.  Without clear guidance from the Supreme 
Court, employers even today find themselves walking “a high tightrope 
without a net beneath them . . . .  On one side lies the possibility of liability 
to minorities in private actions . . . . On the other side is the threat of private 
suits by white employees.”49  Nevertheless, organizations have continued to 
combat workplace discrimination via preference-based affirmative action.50 
As mentioned in Part I, the Remedial Rationale formed the 
justification of such efforts for decades.51  Today, however, employers are 
implementing a different strategy preferring to use affirmative action to 
foster a diverse workforce rather than admit and remedy past 
discrimination.  In other words, the Diversity Spotlight Rationale currently 
outshines the Remedial Rationale.52 
 
 49. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(Wisdom, J., dissenting); see also Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Affirmative Action 
Benefiting Particular Employers or Prospective Employees as Violating Other Employees’ 
Rights Under Federal Constitution or Under Federal Civil Rights Legislation – Supreme 
Court Cases, 92 L. ED. 2D 849, 2(A) (2009) (discussing this issue and stating that: 
“in attempting to rectify the effects of past discriminatory practices, courts and 
others frequently find themselves in a dilemma:  the only way to correct past 
discrimination sometimes seems to be the imposition of discrimination on 
members of the male sex or the white majority--that is, a preference given to 
one group automatically discriminates against all other persons who are not 
members of that group and who are in competition with it, and thus results in a 
form of discrimination which some courts have styled ‘inverse’ or ‘majority’ 
discrimination, but which most courts have called ‘reverse’ discrimination.”), 
40th Anniversary, supra note 22, at 559  (stating: 
“[V]oluntary efforts result in an obvious tension with Title VII’s prohibitions on 
discrimination. Title VII's literal language imposes liability for discrimination 
against any person on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
which contrasts with Congress' intent to encourage voluntary action by 
employers in creating employment opportunities for minorities and women, 
which may include preferential treatment of one race or gender of employees 
over another.”) (citations omitted). 
 50. See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 110-L, supra note 10, at 30 (“[The] prototype for an 
affirmative action program [implemented by a private employer] was the agreement signed 
by the Lockheed aircraft company in 1961 after a complaint against its employment 
practices . . . was filed by the NAACP.”).  This plan required the company to take “special 
efforts to recruit and employ black workers in both white and blue collar jobs.”  Id.  Many 
of the early affirmative action plans went by the name Plan for Progress.  Id. 
 51. One of the first affirmative action plans was entered into after a complaint was filed 
by the NAACP.  Id.  There is evidence that these early plans were ineffective.  Id. (stating 
that 103 of the earliest affirmative action plans only increased the number of blacks 
employed within companies with such plans from 5.1 percent to 5.7 percent over a two year 
period).  
 52. See, e.g., 40th Anniversary, supra note 22, at 559 (“The vast majority of affirmative 
action programs in the United States do not fall into either the government contract or court-
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With this history in mind, how should businesses desiring to 
implement diversity-based affirmative action programs proceed?  The best 
course of action is deceptively simple.  Employers should understand and 
comply with EEOC guidance but, more importantly, adhere as closely as 
possible to recent Supreme Court precedent.  This strategy is advisable 
because the Court has the final say under Title VII and has “not yet 
determined whether the EEOC guidelines are entitled to deference by the 
courts.”53  In addition, the EEOC guidelines are “rarely cited in litigation on 
this topic.”54  This reality places the EEOC guidelines, and their express 
approval of affirmative action, on uncertain ground.  On the other hand, 
affirmative action law “has been shaped by Supreme Court jurisprudence” 
interpreting Title VII.55  With the importance of judicial precedent in mind, 
the next section discusses six Supreme Court decisions that have the 
potential to define the limits of voluntary, private affirmative action plans 
under the Diversity Spotlight Rationale.56 
B. Supreme Court Precedent Governing Workplace Minority Preferences 
The Supreme Court approaches workplace affirmative action similarly 
to other cases stemming from legislation – as an exercise in statutory 
interpretation.  However, the Court’s interpretation of Title VII has been 
less than predictable.  This confusion is partially explained by the tension 
between the statute’s explicit anti-discriminatory language and its remedial 
purpose.  The remainder is attributable to the shifting ideological 
composition of the Court between major cases.  Part II concludes with a 
discussion of six Supreme Court cases relevant to private workplace 
affirmative action.  This analysis dissects the reasoning of each majority 
opinion, as well as important concurrences and dissents, and demonstrates 
how each case might impact voluntary, private affirmative action plans 
under the Diversity Spotlight Rationale.  The following holdings are 
highlighted below: 
1) Reverse Discrimination violates Title VII (BURGER 
COURT/McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.); 
 
 
ordered categories.  Rather, most initiatives are voluntary efforts implemented by employers 
to further equal opportunity.”). 
 53. Id. at 560. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Title VII is the primary law governing voluntary affirmative action plans because 
such plans do not involve state action.  See, e.g., Historical Review, supra note 11, at 313-14  
(“Private affirmative action is unique because neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment is applicable; there is no government action involved. Therefore, plaintiffs 
seeking redress from private affirmative action programs are required to use Title VII.”). 
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2) Title VII permits affirmative action under the Remedial 
Rationale to combat conspicuous racial and gender imbalances in 
traditionally segregated job categories (BURGER COURT/United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber) & (REHNQUIST 
COURT/Johnson v. Transportation Agency); 
 
3) Diversity-based affirmative action allowing for individualized 
consideration can be a compelling interest in higher education 
admissions systems under the Equal Protection Clause 
(REHNQUIST COURT/Gratz v. Bollinger & Grutter v. Bollinger); 
and 
 
4) Diversity-based affirmative action is not a compelling interest 
in primary and secondary school selection under the Equal 
Protection Clause (ROBERTS COURT/Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District). 
(1) Reverse Discrimination Violates Title VII-McDonald 
Arguably, the line of workplace affirmative action precedent began 
with McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.57  In McDonald, two 
white employees and their black colleague were suspected of theft 
stemming from the same incident.58  The company terminated the white 
employees but retained the black employee without good cause.59  This led 
to a Title VII lawsuit alleging racial discrimination.60  A unanimous Court 
held that employers cannot discipline white employees more harshly than 
black employees for the same infraction.61  More generally, the majority 
interpreted Title VII as prohibiting discrimination directed at any race – not 
only discrimination directed at blacks.62  In the words of Justice Thurgood 
 
 57. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 58. Id. at 275-76. 
 59. Id. at 276. 
 60. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting the discrimination against “any 
individual,” in the employment context, due to “such individual’s race”).  The plaintiffs also 
claimed a violation of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  McDonald, 427 U.S. at 
276. 
 61. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 283 (holding that “[w]hile [an employer] may decide that 
participation in a theft of cargo may render an employee unqualifi[ed] [sic] for employment, 
this criterion must be ‘applied, alike to members of all races,’ and Title VII is violated if, as 
petitioners alleged, it was not.”).  The District Court determined Section 1981 to be “wholly 
inapplicable to racial discrimination against white persons” and determined that it lacked 
jurisdiction over both the Section 1981 claim and the Title VII claim.  Id. at 277.  The final 
unanimous vote was 7-0 as Justices Stevens and Powell did not participate.  Id. at 274. 
 62. Id. at 280 (“We therefore hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination 
against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable 
were they Negroes and [the black employee who was charged but not terminated] white.”). 
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Marshall, Title VII “prohibits all racial discrimination in employment.”63 
McDonald was not based on an explicit affirmative action plan which 
preferred minorities in disciplinary decisions.  However, the Court’s color-
blind interpretation of Title VII left existing preference programs in serious 
jeopardy.  Because preferences inherently discriminate on the basis of race, 
this decision provided white employees injured by affirmative action plans 
with powerful ammunition.  To find a safe harbor, companies are forced to 
distinguish the facts of McDonald from their affirmative action programs.  
Today, employers are wise to argue that their minority preferences 
distinguish by race, but in a positive manner intended to advance Title 
VII’s mandate to eliminate discriminatory treatment, which harms 
protected classes.  This is a concept controversially referred to as “benign 
discrimination.”64  The Court’s next relevant affirmative action decision 
answered the major question left open after McDonald:  whether Title VII 
forbids private employers from voluntarily engaging in benign 
discrimination by providing racial preferences to remedy prior 
discrimination.65 
(2) Title VII Permits Affirmative Action under the Remedial Rationale 
to Combat Conspicuous Imbalances in Traditionally Segregated 
Job Categories–Weber & Johnson 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber66 constituted the Court’s 
first foray into private workplace affirmative action.67  In 1974, the Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chemical Corporation—together with the United 
Steelworkers union—crafted an affirmative action plan.68  This plan was 
not designed to remedy rampant institutional discrimination by Kaiser.69  
 
 63. Id. at 283 (emphasis in original).  The Court also held that Section 1981 prohibited 
discrimination against white employees by a private sector employer.  Id. at 286-87. 
 64. See, e.g., Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“So called ‘benign’ discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and 
apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their 
patronizing indulgence.”). 
 65. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-01 (1979) (“[This 
issue] was expressly left open in [McDonald] which held . . . that Title VII protects whites 
as well as blacks from certain forms of racial discrimination.”). 
 66. Id. at 201. 
 67. See, e.g., 40th Anniversary, supra note 22, at 561 (“[S]hortly after issuance of the 
EEOC's regulations [discussed in Part II(A)], the Supreme Court decided the first case 
involving the permissible contours of voluntary affirmative action plans in the private 
sector.”). 
 68. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-98. 
 69. This issue of whether Kaiser actually discriminated in the past is a bit complicated.  
See id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In this litigation, Kaiser denies prior 
discrimination but concedes that its past hiring practices may be subject to question.”); 
Phillip P. Frickey, John Minor Wisdom Lecture:  Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1169, 
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Instead, its racial preferences targeted the effects of prior discrimination by 
craft unions, which had denied blacks training opportunities required for 
employment as craftsmen.70  The goal was to increase the number of black 
craft employees in Kaiser’s aluminum plant.71  To meet this objective, the 
company created a new training program along with two seniority lists for 
craft trainees – one for white employees and the other for black 
employees.72  For every white trainee selected, a black selection was 
required.73  These preferences would last until the plant’s percentage of 
black skilled craft workers approximated the percentage of blacks in the 
local labor force.74  Weber, a white craft worker with more seniority than 
some of the black craft workers hired under the plan,75 was denied 
admission to the training and filed a Title VII lawsuit alleging racial 
discrimination.76 
In a controversial decision,77 the Supreme Court upheld the plan ruling 
 
1172 (March 2000) [hereinafter Wisdom] (“Until 1974, Kaiser hired as craft workers for [its 
aluminum] plant only persons with prior experience in the craft.  At [the plant relevant in 
Weber], this approach had resulted in a segregated workforce because blacks had 
historically been excluded from craft unions.”) (citations omitted). 
 70. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99. 
 71. Id. at 197-200.  Nearly 40% of the labor force in Kaiser’s neighborhood was black 
but less than 2% of these black employees worked in the craft division; this disparity was 
caused in a large part by racial discrimination, as backs were not allowed by local unions to 
train for craft positions.  Id. at 198-99 (stating that:   
“This case arose from the operation of the plan at Kaiser's plant in Gramercy, 
La. Until 1974, Kaiser hired as craft workers for that plant only persons who 
had had prior craft experience. Because blacks had long been excluded from 
craft unions, few were able to present such credentials. As a consequence, prior 
to 1974 only 1.83% (5 out of 273) of the skilled craft workers at the Gramercy 
plant were black, even though the work force in the Gramercy area was 
approximately 39% black.”) (citations omitted). 
 72. Id. at 199. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; see also Wisdom, supra note 69, at 1173 (stating that:   
“[T]he training program would have required quite a long implementation 
period, ending only when the percentage of African-American craft workers at 
the plant rose from the less than two percent in 1974 to a figure of thirty-nine 
percent, which was then the percentage of blacks in the local workforce.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 75. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199; see also Wisdom, supra note 69, at 1173 (stating that 
Weber had more seniority than two of the seven black trainees selected). 
 76. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199-200 (stating that Weber brought a class action lawsuit in a 
federal district court in Louisiana).  The Court also reiterated the fact that, because no state 
action was involved, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
inapplicable.  Id. at 200. 
 77. See, e.g., What the Weber Ruling Does, TIME, July 9, 1979, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,920466,00.html (“[The Weber] ruling 
will undoubtedly breed some resentment.  Weber himself last week predicted that the 
decision will have ‘a negative effect on people all over the country toward blacks.’”); Don 
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that Title VII allows voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans78 
when: 
1)  Preferences are intended to “eliminate conspicuous racial 
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories”;79 
2)  The rights of white employees are “not unnecessarily 
trammeled”—-meaning that the plan neither (a) requires the 
 
Munro, Note, The Continuing Evolution of Affirmative Action under Title VII:  New 
Directions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 81 VA. L. REV. 565, 576 (1995) (“[The] 
Supreme Court specifically upheld voluntary affirmative action by private employers in its 
controversial decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber in 1979.”) (citations omitted). 























































Majority Plan does not Violate Title VII 
It appears that Justice Powell did not participate, because he had been sick at the time of the 
case, and that Justice Stevens did not participate, because he had previously represented 
Kaiser as a private attorney in Illinois.  See Wisdom, supra note 69, at 1175. 
 79. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 (“[T]he adoption of the Kaiser-USWA plan for the 
Gramercy plant falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector 
voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial 
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.”). 
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termination of white employees and their replacement with black 
employees nor (b) creates an absolute bar to the advancement of 
white employees;80 and 
3)  Preferences are temporary in their duration.81 
Because Kaiser’s plan met these three requirements, its race-based 
classifications did not run afoul of Title VII.82  The majority identified that 
its decision may seem at odds with the letter of Title VII, but argued that it 
was within the statute’s spirit.83  In addition, Justice Brennan’s opinion did 
 
 80. Id. at 208 (“[T]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white 
employees.  The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement 
with new black hirees.  Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement of white 
employees; half of those trained in the program will be white.”) (citations omitted). 
 81. Id. (“[T]he plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial 
balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.  Preferential selection of craft 
trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled 
craftworkers [sic] in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local 
labor force.”). 
 82. Id. at 204-06 (stating:   
“Our conclusion is further reinforced by examination of the language and 
legislative history of § 703(j) of Title VII.  Opponents of Title VII raised two 
related arguments against the bill.  First, they argued that the Act would be 
interpreted to require employers with racially imbalanced work forces to grant 
preferential treatment to racial minorities in order to integrate.  Second, they 
argued that employers with racially imbalanced work forces would grant 
preferential treatment to racial minorities, even if not required to do so by the 
Act.  Had Congress meant to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative action, as 
respondent urges, it easily could have answered both objections by providing 
that Title VII would not require or permit racially preferential integration 
efforts.  But Congress did not choose such a course. Rather, Congress added § 
703(j) which addresses only the first objection.  The section provides that 
nothing contained in Title VII "shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . 
to grant preferential treatment . . . to any group because of the race . . . of such . 
. . group on account of" a de facto racial imbalance in the employer's work 
force.  The section does not state that "nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted 
to permit" voluntary affirmative efforts to correct racial imbalances.  The 
natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-
conscious affirmative action.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 201-02 (“It is a ‘familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the 
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of 
its makers.’  The prohibition against racial discrimination in . . . Title VII must therefore be 
read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical context 
from which the Act arose.”) (citations omitted).  Not all scholars believe that Title VII’s 
anti-discrimination provisions are clear.  See, e.g., Wisdom, supra note 69, at 1179 
(discussing sections § 703(a)(1)-(2), (d) of Title VII and stating that these three provisions 
contain “language that can be rather easily read as invalidating the Kaiser/Steelworkers 
apprenticeship program.  In a sense, though, that is as much an analytical problem for 
Weber as a benefit.  If the statute is to have textual integrity, it should not have provisions 
that overlap each other in varying degrees of specificity and varying breadths of 
coverage.”). 
CIOCCHETTIFINALIZED_ONE 3/31/2010  1:59:33 AM 
302 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
not cabin the validity of affirmative action under Title VII to Weber’s 
narrow facts.  Instead, the majority expressly stated that the Court “need 
not today define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and 
impermissible affirmative action plans.”84 
In an interesting concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed that Kaiser’s 
plan was valid but intimated that the majority had gone too far with its 
expansive view of permissible affirmative action.85  He read Brennan’s 
opinion to mean that a private sector employer need not point to prior 
institutional discrimination or even to “arguable” violations of Title VII 
before choosing to preference one race over another.86  Blackmun believed 
that remedying this type of societal discrimination went further than Title 
VII allowed.87 
Chief Justice Burger’s dissent took a much stronger position.  Burger 
argued that Kaiser’s plan violated the express language of Title VII.88  In 
stating that this case should have been a no-brainer, Burger claimed that: 
Often we have difficulty interpreting statutes either because of 
imprecise drafting or because legislative compromises have 
produced genuine ambiguities.  But here there is no lack of 
clarity, no ambiguity.  The quota embodied in the collective-
bargaining agreement between Kaiser and the Steelworkers 
unquestionably discriminates on the basis of race against 
individual employees seeking admission to on-the-job training 
 
 84. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
 85. Id. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“‘Traditionally segregated job categories,’ 
where they exist, sweep far more broadly than the class of ‘arguable violations’ of Title VII.  
The Court’s expansive approach is somewhat disturbing for me . . . .”).  Some legal 
scholarship on the matter concluded that Brennan’s opinion was not as well thought out and 
articulated as it could have been considering that the case arose at the end of the Court’s 
term.  See Wisdom, supra note 69, at 1177 (“[W]ith all due respect for Justice Brennan . . . 
the opinion is a failure:  it so lacks persuasive methodological power as to raise questions . . 
. about the Court's candor in identifying the real reasons why five Justices voted as they 
did.”). 
 86. Weber, 443 U.S. at 212 (“The Court, however, declines to consider the narrow 
‘arguable violation’ approach and adheres instead to an interpretation of Title VII that 
permits affirmative action by an employer whenever the job category in question is 
‘traditionally segregated.’ . . . [T]he Court considers a job to be ‘traditionally segregated’ 
when there has been a societal history of purposeful exclusion . . . .”). 
 87. Id. at 212-15 (stating that:   
“[T]he Congress that passed Title VII probably thought it was adopting a 
principle of nondiscrimination that would apply to blacks and whites alike.  
While setting aside that principle can be justified where necessary to advance 
statutory policy by encouraging reasonable responses as a form of voluntary 
compliance that mitigates “arguable violations,” discarding the principle of 
nondiscrimination where no countervailing statutory policy exists appears to be 
at odds with the bargain struck when Title VII was enacted.”). 
 88. Id. at 216-17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that “the Court’s judgment . . . is 
contrary to the explicit language of the statute” and citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d)). 
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programs.  And, under the plain language of [Title VII], that is 
"an unlawful employment practice."89 
Eight years later, with two new Justices on the bench, the Supreme 
Court faced its second major workplace affirmative action case.  Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County90 analyzed a voluntary 
affirmative action plan by the Santa Clara County government.  This plan 
attempted to remedy low percentages of women, minorities, and 
handicapped individuals within the County’s employ.91  The terms of the 
plan did not allow quota-based hiring and promotion but advocated that 
County managers use protected class status as a plus factor in employment 
decisions.92  Similar to Kaiser’s preference plan, Santa Clara targeted 
historical underrepresentation in job classifications but was not remedying 
 
 89. Id. at 217.  Justice Rehnquist dissented for similar reasons and stated that: 
Thus, by a tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and 
Hughes, but of escape artists such as Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory 
language, "uncontradicted" legislative history, and uniform precedent in 
concluding that employers are, after all, permitted to consider race in making 
employment decisions . . . . 
. . . . 
Our task in this case, like any other case involving the construction of a statute, 
is to give effect to the intent of Congress.  To divine that intent, we traditionally 
look first to the words of the statute and, if they are unclear, then to the statute's 
legislative history.  Finding the desired result hopelessly foreclosed by these 
conventional sources, the Court turns to a third source -- the "spirit" of the Act. 
But close examination of what the Court proffers as the spirit of the Act reveals 
it as the spirit animating the present majority, not the 88th Congress.  For if the 
spirit of the Act eludes the cold words of the statute itself, it rings out with 
unmistakable clarity in the words of the elected representatives who made the 
Act law. It is equality. 
Id. at 222 and 253-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 90. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616 (1987).  When Johnson was decided 1987, Justices 
O’Connor and Scalia had been conformed to the Court and Justices Burger and Stewart had 
retired. 
 91. Id. at 620-21 (“In December 1978, the Santa Clara County Transit District Board of 
Supervisors adopted an Affirmative Action Plan (Plan) for the County Transportation 
Agency. The Plan implemented a County Affirmative Action Plan, which had been adopted, 
declared the County, because ‘mere prohibition of discriminatory practices is not enough to 
remedy the effects of past practices and to permit attainment of an equitable representation 
of minorities, women and handicapped persons.’ Relevant to this case, the Agency Plan 
provides that, in making promotions to positions within a traditionally segregated job 
classification in which women have been significantly underrepresented, the Agency is 
authorized to consider as one factor the sex of a qualified applicant.”  (citations omitted)). 
 92. Id. at 622 (“The Agency's Plan thus set aside no specific number of positions for 
minorities or women, but authorized the consideration of ethnicity or sex as a factor when 
evaluating qualified candidates for jobs in which members of such groups were poorly 
represented.”). 
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its prior discriminatory practices.93 
Subsequent to the plan’s adoption, the County opened a road 
dispatcher position.94  Officials had seven qualified candidates to choose 
from for a road dispatcher position and ultimately recommended that a 
white male (Johnson) receive the job.95  At the same time, a female 
employee (Joyce) contacted the County’s Affirmative Action Coordinator 
who made a recommendation to the Director that Joyce should receive the 
job instead of Johnson.96  The Director chose Joyce and defended his 
choice with the following statement:  “I tried to look at the whole picture, 
the combination of her qualifications and Mr. Johnson's qualifications, their 
test scores, their expertise [sic], their background [sic], affirmative action 
matters, things like that . . . .  I believe it was a combination of all those."97  
After the decision, Johnson filed a Title VII lawsuit claiming that the 
Affirmative Action Plan discriminated against him on the basis of sex.98 
The Supreme Court looked to the criteria utilized in Weber to analyze 
the County’s plan.99  The Court looked for a “‘manifest imbalance’ that 
 
 93. Id. at 621 (“In reviewing the composition of its work force, the Agency noted in its 
Plan that women were represented in numbers far less than their proportion of the County 
labor force in both the Agency as a whole and in five of seven job categories.  Specifically, 
while women constituted 36.4% of the area labor market, they composed only 22.4% of 
Agency employees. . . . As for the job classification relevant to this case, none of the 238 
Skilled Craft Worker positions was held by a woman.  The Plan noted that this 
underrepresentation of women in part reflected the fact that women had not traditionally 
been employed in these positions, and that they had not been strongly motivated to seek 
training or employment in them because of the limited opportunities that have existed in the 
past for them to work in such classifications.”) (citations omitted). 
 94. Id. at 623 (“On December 12, 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy for the 
promotional position of road dispatcher in the Agency's Roads Division.”). 
 95. Id. at 623-24 (describing the job selection process). 
 96. Id. at 624 (“The Coordinator recommended to the Director of the Agency, James 
Graebner, that Joyce be promoted.”). 
 97. Id. at 625.  The Director also considered the evaluations for each candidate, which 
stated that: 
[B]oth [Joyce] and Johnson were rated as well qualified for the job.  The 
evaluation of Joyce read:  "Well qualified by virtue of 18 years of past clerical 
experience including 3 1/2 years at West Yard plus almost 5 years as a [road 
maintenance worker]."  The evaluation of Johnson was as follows:  "Well 
qualified applicant; two years of [road maintenance worker] experience plus 11 
years of Road Yard Clerk.  Has had previous outside Dispatch experience but 
was 13 years ago.”  [The Director] testified that he did not regard as significant 
the fact that Johnson scored 75 and Joyce 73 when interviewed by the two-
person board. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 98. Id. (“Petitioner Johnson filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that he had been 
denied promotion on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.”). 
 99. Id. at 627-28 (“The assessment of the legality of the Agency Plan must be guided by 
our decision in Weber . . . .”). 
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reflected underrepresentation of women in ‘traditionally segregated job 
categories.’”100  In searching for such, the Court analyzed the percentage of 
women in the company’s workforce as compared to that in the area labor 
market or in the general population.101 
In concluding that the County’s plan did not violate Title VII, the 
Court found that a manifest imbalance in road dispatcher positions did exist 
- in fact, none of the 238 Skilled Craft workers in the County were 
women.102  This led the Court to the obvious conclusion that women were 
underrepresented in this job category.103  The majority opinion in Johnson 
found that the County’s affirmative action plan was based on aspirations 
and not quotas and, at the same time, that the plan did not unnecessarily 
trammel the rights of the County’s male employees.104  Additionally, the 
 
 100. Id. at 631. 
 101. Id. at 631-33 (stating that this proportionality test is appropriate when analyzing 
jobs that require no special expertise).  When a job requires special expertise, the relevant 
comparison is with the percentage of the area’s labor force possessing the requisite 
expertise.  Id. at 632 (citing Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 
(1977) (holding that the proper comparison for a specialized position rests in an analysis of 
how the percentage of black teachers in a company’s employ ranks with percentage of 
qualified black teachers in the labor force of the surrounding area)). 
 102. Id. at 636. 
 103. Id. at 634 (stating that:   
“It is clear that the decision to hire Joyce was made pursuant to [a County] plan 
that directed that sex or race be taken into account for the purpose of remedying 
underrepresentation. The [County’s] Plan acknowledged the ‘limited 
opportunities that have existed in the past,’ for women to find employment in 
certain job classifications ‘where women have not been traditionally employed 
in significant numbers.’  As a result, observed the Plan, women were 
concentrated in traditionally female jobs in the [County], and represented a 
lower percentage in other job classifications than would be expected if such 
traditional segregation had not occurred. Specifically, 9 of the 10 Para-
Professionals and 110 of the 145 Office and Clerical Workers were women. By 
contrast, women were only 2 of the 28 Officials and Administrators, 5 of the 58 
Professionals, 12 of the 124 Technicians, none of the Skilled Craft Workers, 
and 1—who was Joyce—of the 110 Road Maintenance Workers. The Plan 
sought to remedy these imbalances through ‘hiring, training and promotion of . . 
. women throughout the [County] in all major job classifications where they are 
underrepresented.”) (citations omitted). 
 104. Id. at 635 (stating that the plan did not contain quotas); see also id. at 638 (stating 
that the plan did not trammel on the rights of male employees).  The following chart lists 












Majority Plan does not Violate Title VII 
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majority opinion stated that the purposes of Title VII would be thwarted if 
companies were not allowed to institute voluntary affirmative action 
plans.105 
(3) Diversity can be a compelling interest in higher education—but 
not in K-12 education—under the Equal Protection Clause 
The Supreme Court’s most recent affirmative action decisions—Gratz 
v. Bollinger,106 Grutter v. Bollinger,107 and Parents Involved in Community 

































Minority Plan Violates Title VII 
 
 105. Id. at 630 (following the Court’s rationale from Weber that found that the intent of 
Title VII contemplates the idea that companies might create voluntary affirmative action 
plans). 
 106. Gratz, 539 U.S. 244. 
 107. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
 108. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701. 
 109. It is also important to note that the Supreme Court granted certiorari and recently 
decided a reverse discrimination case in its 2008-2009 term which may impact affirmative 
action. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (questioning whether a municipality 
may decline to certify an employment examination because the results would lead to more 
whites being promoted and potential discrimination charges).  In a 93-page decision 
(including two concurrences and one dissent) the Supreme Court held that the municipality 
in question violated Title VII by declining to certify the employment examination.  Id. at 
2681 (holding that: 
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connection rests in the reasons underlying these education-based preference 
plans.  In each case, the organization promulgating affirmative action 
avoided the Remedial Rationale and relied instead on the Diversity 
Spotlight Rationale.  Although none of these cases deals directly with 
private workplaces, each will likely impact affirmative action arising in this 
arena.110  The remainder of this section summarizes how a diversity-based 
goal impacted the analysis of the Justices.  Part IV analyzes the potential 
future impact of these decisions as precedent when diversity-based 
workplace preferences are challenged in court.111 
In Gratz, the University of Michigan was sued by white applicants for 
implementing a voluntary affirmative action plan (in the form of an 
admissions policy) that helped determine its incoming class.112  This plan 
generated controversy because it awarded minority applicants a 
predetermined amount of points specifically for being part of a specific 
underrepresented group.113  This plan was not based on prior discrimination 
by Michigan;114 instead, Michigan granted preferences in the interest of 
obtaining a diverse class.115 
 
 “[c]onfronted with arguments both for and against certifying the test results—
and threats of a lawsuit either way—the City was required to make a difficult 
inquiry.  But its hearings produced no strong evidence of a disparate-impact 
violation, and the City was not entitled to disregard the tests based solely on the 
racial disparity in the results.”).   
As expected, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas voted in 
the majority.  Id. 
 110. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work:  Diversity, Integration, and 
Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 19 (2005) (stating 
that answering the question of whether Grutter might impact “the legality of workforce 
diversity programs that give an edge in hiring and promotions to members of 
underrepresented racial and ethnic groups . . . [requires crossing] both the line between 
education and employment and the line between the Constitution and Title VII.”).  Estlund 
continues by stating that “we have already seen [that]... the emanations of the Supreme 
Court's affirmative action decisions are so not easily cabined [by the different arenas].”  Id. 
 111. See, id. at 4 ( “[By] recognizing legitimate non-remedial justifications for 
affirmative action in higher education, Grutter may suggest an alternative defense of 
affirmative action in employment that better fits both what employers are doing and what 
they are proclaiming under the banner of diversity.”). 
 112. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 252 (stating that the plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit 
claiming violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Section 1981, Section 1983 and Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 113. Id. at 278 (concurring in the decision on the part of Justice O’Connor).  In fact, 
minorities were awarded a significant number of points (20 out of a total of 150 with 100 
points generally necessary for admission).  Id.  The undergraduate admissions policy also 
granted a predetermined number of points for other qualifications such as attendance at a 
disadvantaged high school or athletic accomplishments.  Id. 
 114. Id. at 268 (stating that Michigan did not rely on the Remedial Rationale). 
 115. Id. at 257 (stating that the University of Michigan “contended that the [college of 
Literature, Science and the Arts] has . . . an interest in the educational benefits that result 
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Because the case revolved around state action not involving 
employment, the Court analyzed it under the Equal Protection Clause and 
not Title VII.116  Racial classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment 
require courts to conduct a strict scrutiny review.117  Strict scrutiny 
mandates that the party implementing affirmative action:  (1) have a 
compelling interest in making distinctions based on race and (2) ensure that 
the classification plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling 
interest.118  In Gratz, the majority held that seeking diversity for educational 
purposes is a compelling interest but that the awarding of a set number of 
points to minority applicants was not a narrowly tailored means to achieve 
this interest.119  The awarding of points, the Court held, did not treat each 
applicant as an individual or on an individualized basis.120 
 
from having a racially and ethnically diverse student body and that its program is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.”). 
 116. Id. at 270. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 275. 














































Minority Michigan’s Plan Constitutional 
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However, the Court reached a different conclusion regarding a similar 
higher education affirmative action plan in Grutter.121  The issue revolved 
around a voluntary preference plan (also contained in an admissions 
policy)122 created by the University of Michigan’s School of Law.  As in 
Gratz, this Plan was not created to remedy past discrimination.123  Instead, 
the plan authorized the use of an applicant’s race124 as a plus factor to 
obtain a critical mass of students able to foster educational diversity.125  
Importantly, this plan did not allot a predetermined number of points based 
on race as in Gratz, but instead allowed for a more individualized 










Majority Michigan’s Plan Unconstitutional 
 
 121. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 122. Id. at 312-16 (discussing Michigan’s affirmative action plan).  The Michigan Plan 
began in 1992 when the Dean of the law school charged a faculty committee with producing 
a written admissions policy that encompassed the following goals:  (1) to admit a group of 
the most capable students (both individually and collectively), (2) to admit individuals with 
a strong promise of success in law school and in the practice of law, (3) to admit individuals 
who will contribute to the well-being of others and (4) to admit “‘a mix of students with 
varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from each other.’”  Id. at 
313-14 (citing Michigan’s stated admissions goals).  Michigan’s faculty unanimously 
approved the committee’s plan and the document became the school’s official admissions 
policy.  Id. at 315. 
 123. Id. at 319 (quoting the chairperson of the committee that drafted the admissions 
policy, Professor Richard Lempert, who stated that the language of the Policy “did not 
purport to remedy past discrimination, but rather to include students who may bring to the 
Law School a perspective different from that of members of groups which have not been the 
victims of such discrimination.”).  In addition, “Lempert acknowledged that other groups, 
such as Asians and Jews, have experienced discrimination, but explained they were not 
mentioned in the policy because individuals who are members of those groups were already 
being admitted to the Law School in significant numbers.”  Id. 
 124. It is important to note that only some minority groups were given preference by the 
plan.  Id. at 316 (reiterating Michigan’s commitment to “‘one particular type of diversity,’ 
that is, ‘racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from 
groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, 
Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in 
our student body in meaningful numbers.’”). 
 125. Id. at 311 (stating the issue of the case); see also id. at 330 (stating that Michigan 
believed that a critical mass of underrepresented minority students “promotes ‘cross-racial 
understanding,’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, . . . ‘enables [students] to better 
understand persons of different races’” and assists students in what has become a diverse, 
global workforce). 
 126. The plan was based off of Justice Powell’s ruling in Bakke that the creation of a 
diverse educational environment can be a compelling governmental interest.  See Regents of 
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The Supreme Court, in a controversial five-to-four decision,127 
affirmed the Sixth Circuit, which validated the constitutionality of the law 
school’s plan.128  The majority argued that obtaining a diverse student body 
is a compelling governmental interest as it relates to admissions to 
institutions of higher public education and that Michigan’s Plan was 
narrowly tailored to serve this compelling interest.  In so ruling, the Court 
stated that remedying past discrimination is not the only compelling 
 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Baake, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (discussing the need to categorically 
broaden the search for diversity). 



























Minority Law School’s Plan Unconstitutional 
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Minority Law School’s Plan Unconstitutional 
 
 128. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003). 
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justification allowing for the creation of an affirmative action plan.129  The 
majority gave deference to the academic judgment of Michigan as a 
university and stated that the ideas of academic freedom, freedom of 
speech, and freedom of thought place universities in a “special niche in our 
constitutional tradition.”130  In addition, the Court found that the Plan’s 
aspiration of a critical mass was not the same as racial balancing or quotas 
that were ruled unconstitutional in Bakke.131  Michigan’s Plan was 
constitutional because it looked at each applicant as an individual and was 
flexible in its approach to race:  retaining the ability to use race as a plus 
factor in admission decisions, without being forced to award points in a 
predetermined, mechanical fashion to underrepresented minority 
applicants.132  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion concluded with a 
discussion of the idea that all affirmative action plans must be limited in 
duration and that Michigan’s Plan should accomplish its goal and end in 
twenty-five years.133 
Four Justices—Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas—dissented in 
Grutter.134  The dissenters agreed with the majority about the use of strict 
scrutiny in affirmative action cases involving race, but they disagreed that 
Michigan’s Plan was narrowly tailored.135  In fact, the Justices felt that the 
 
 129. Id. at 328, 334.  The Court claimed that it had not addressed the issue of race in 
public education since the Bakke case and that other Supreme Court precedent did not 
foreclose diversity as a compelling governmental interest.  Id. at 328. 
 130. Id. at 329. 
 131. Id. at 334-37. 
 132. Id. at 337. 
 133. See id. at 342 (quoting Justice O’Connor’s statement in the majority opinion stating 
that: 
“[the Court is] mindful, however, that ‘[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination 
based on race.’  Accordingly, race-conscious admissions policies must be 
limited in time.  This requirement reflects that racial classifications, however 
compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed 
no more broadly than the interest demands.  Enshrining a permanent 
justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal 
protection principle.  We see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions 
programs from the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a 
logical end point.  The Law School, too, concedes that all ‘race-conscious 
programs must have reasonable durational limits.’”) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). 
 134. Id. at 378. 
 135. See id. at 378-79 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating:   
“I do not believe, however, that the University of Michigan Law School’s . . . 
means are narrowly tailored to the interest it asserts.  The Law School claims it 
must take the steps it does to achieve a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented 
minority students.  But its actual program bears no relation to this asserted goal.  
Stripped of its ‘critical mass’ veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a 
naked effort to achieve racial balancing.”) (citation omitted). 
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majority’s use of the strict scrutiny test was extremely lenient and that 
Michigan’s aspiration of enrolling a critical mass was not shown through 
its actual enrollment practices.136  Through this discussion, the dissenters 
implied that Michigan’s true goal was to increase the overall enrollment of 
black students without paying much concern to other underrepresented 
minority groups such as Hispanics and Native Americans.137 
Finally, in Parents Involved In Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1,138 the Roberts Court heard its first affirmative action case, 
which occurred in the arena of K-12 public education.  In this case, a group 
of parents in the Seattle and Louisville School Districts challenged race-
based preference plans that denied their children the school of their 
choice.139  Arguably relying on Grutter, both districts voluntarily created 
plans to increase diversity rather than to remedy prior discrimination.140  
The five-to-four majority held that these plans violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.141  Applying strict scrutiny, Chief Justice Roberts’ 
 
 136. Id. at 379–81. 
 137. See id. at 382 (reviewing actual admissions figures showing a drastically lower 
enrollment of Hispanic and Native American students). 
 138. Parents Involved In Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 55 U.S. 
701 (2007). 
 139. Id. at 701-09. 
 140. Id. at 724-25. 
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majority opinion struck down both plans as not being narrowly tailored 
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Majority K-12 Preference Plan Unconstitutional 
 
 142. See id. at 734 (quoting the Ninth Circuit that stated, the defendant [Seattle in this 
case] “has not met its burden of proving these marginal changes . . . outweigh the cost of 
subjecting hundreds of students to disparate treatment based solely on the color of their 
skin”) (citation omitted).  The Court was only able to muster a plurality opinion—Justice 
Kennedy would not join—declining to determine whether diversity is a compelling interest 
at the K-12 level.  See id. at 726 (stating that: 
“[The] parties and their amici dispute whether racial diversity in schools in fact 
has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves 
intangible socialization benefits.  The debate is not one we need to resolve, 
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The opinion distinguished the need for diversity in higher education 
from the need for diversity in primary and secondary education and refused 
to apply Grutter’s reasoning.143  The Chief Justice ended with the strong 
statement that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
stop discriminating on the basis of race.”144 
Justice Kennedy agreed with the substance of the majority opinion but 
filed a concurrence to make clear that he identified a compelling interest in 
K-12 diversity and in avoiding racial isolation.145  In fact, Kennedy would 
“allow race conscious policies which could include line drawing, new 
school placement, and the recruitment of students and faculty without 
resorting to strict scrutiny as long as individual students were not subjected 
to different treatment on account of race.”146  However, this crucial swing 
Justice voted to strike down these specific plans because of their failure to 
meet the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny.147  Justice Breyer 
penned a dissent—joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens—
accusing the majority of violating the legacy of Brown and arguing that 
color-blind integration plans have not been effective.148 
Part III utilizes this background information and precedent to 
introduce the Diversity Spotlight Rationale and analyze three key 
components necessary for any diversity-based, voluntary workplace 
affirmative action plan to theoretically survive scrutiny by the current 
Court. 
III. EXAMINING THE DIVERSITY SPOTLIGHT RATIONALE AND ITS KEY 
COMPONENTS 
Despite walking a tightrope between liability and remediation, 
businesses continue to promulgate preference-based affirmative action 
plans.149  However, as evidenced by the multitude of amicus briefs filed in 
 
however, because it is clear that the racial classifications employed by the 
districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and 
social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity.”). 
 143. Id. at 724-25. 
 144. Id. at 747. 
 145. Id. at 783. 
 146. Craig L. Jackson, United States Supreme Court’s 2006-2007 Term, Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties, and a New Direction, 36 CAP. U.L. REV. 511, 554 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 147. Id. at 783-84. 
 148. Id. at 788. 
 149. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Affirmative Action Plans are Now Part of the Normal 
Corporate Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at A20 (quoting Alfred W. 
Blumrosen—a law professor and former EEOC official—who was discussing the 
prominence of affirmative action in the contemporary workplace, and who stated that 
“[a]ffirmative action programs are so much a part of the way industry operates today that to 
try to de-establish them would create enormous difficulties”). 
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Grutter, it appears that many of America’s most prominent businesses have 
abandoned the Remedial Rationale as a justification.150  Instead, 
contemporary affirmative action programs are justified under the Diversity 
Spotlight Rationale.151  This change is far from subtle.  As detailed in Part I, 
the Supreme Court ruled in Weber152 and Johnson153 that the Remedial 
 
 150. This trend is in part evidenced by the multitude of amicus briefs filed in Grutter, 
implying that such programs will be created in the future.  It is important to note that the 
filing of a brief with a court and the actual creation of such a plan based on the Diversity 
Spotlight Rationale are two different things.  Concerning the latter, some companies tout on 
their websites their dedication to increasing diversity within their workforces; however, the 
same companies do not go into detail as to the specifics of minority preference programs.  
For example, 3M seems to have created a diversity-based, forward-looking affirmative 
action policy, which it summarizes briefly on its Website.  See 3M, Diversity At 3M: 
Recruiting, http://solutions.3m.com/wps/portal/3M/en_US/us-
diversity/diversity/3M/recruiting/ (last visited May 31, 2009) (claiming that the company’s 
Workforce Diversity Department “provides direction and support to enhance recruitment of 
candidates for student and career employment”); see also American Express, Diversity at 
Work, 
http://www212.americanexpress.com/dsmlive/dsm/int/staffing/staffing_diversity_empl_net
works.do?vgnextoid=dc2ccc9c63e00210VgnVCM200000d0faad94RCRD (last visited Oct. 
27, 2009) (listing various employee networks active within the company such as the 
Hispanic Network, Asian Employee Network and Black Employee Network); American 
Express, Diversity Recruiting Events, 
http://www212.americanexpress.com/dsmlive/dsm/int/amexjobs/amex_jobsspecialevents.do
?vgnextoid=dd984fdc47310210VgnVCM100000defaad94RCRD (last visited May 29, 
2009) (listing eleven job fairs specifically targeting minority applicants).  It is also possible 
that the policies mentioned above are merely non-preference-based minority recruitment 
options as opposed to preference-based affirmative action plans.  Regardless, companies are 
placing diversity high on their recruitment priority lists.  See, e.g., Jessica Calleja, Diversity 
Recruiting, JOBPOSTINGS, http://www.jobpostings.net/articleDetail.cfm?id=251 (last visited 
May 31, 2009) (“[As the] American demographic continues to change and the population of 
visible minorities continues to grow, companies are discovering it only makes sense to take 
advantage of this emerging talent by making diversity recruiting a priority.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, Grutter, The Diversity Justification, and Workplace 
Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 200 (2004-05) [hereinafter Diversity Justification] 
(“[In] the wake of Grutter it can be anticipated . . . that public as well as private employers 
will consider and develop diversity-based justifications for voluntary affirmative action in 
their workplaces.”) (footnote omitted). 
 152. See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 
(1979) (“We conclude, therefore, that the adoption of the Kaiser-USWA plan for the 
Gramercy plant falls within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector 
voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial 
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.”). 
 153. Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987) (stating:   
“We therefore hold that the Agency appropriately took into account as one 
factor the sex of Diane Joyce in determining that she should be promoted to the 
road dispatcher position. The decision to do so was made pursuant to an 
affirmative action plan that represents a moderate, flexible, case-by-case 
approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities 
and women in the Agency's work force. Such a plan is fully consistent with 
Title VII, for it embodies the contribution that voluntary employer action can 
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Rationale does not violate the anti-discrimination mandate of Title VII.  In 
fact, the law allows such benign discrimination as long as employers seek 
to remedy prior discrimination in the following ways:  (1) institutionally or 
(2) in traditionally segregated job categories (as opposed to societal 
discrimination more generally).154 
On the contrary, forward-looking preferences promulgated under the 
Diversity Spotlight Rationale have yet to gain the same level of judicial 
approval – at least in the private workplace arena.155  Part III examines the 
foundation of this emerging justification.  The section moves on to analyze 
three key components that should be present in any diversity-based 
preference plan to make it compliant with the precedent detailed in Part II.  
Part IV concludes with an evaluation of whether just such a preference plan 
based on the DSR and containing these three key components is likely to 
survive Title VII scrutiny by a conservative-leaning Supreme Court. 
A. The Diversity Spotlight Rationale:  A Big Picture Perspective 
The claim that diversity is an important component of a company’s 
workforce is nothing new.156  In fact, businesses have been making 
 
make in eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (considering a 
case of race-based layoffs of teachers employed by a public school system and stating that 
“[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially 
classified remedy”); see also Diversity Justification, supra note 151, at 232 (stating that: 
“[As] a matter of doctrine, Grutter's constitutional analysis did not apply to the 
now well-settled position that employers covered by Title VII may engage in 
voluntary affirmative action as a means of integrating traditionally segregated 
job categories and addressing manifest imbalances in particular occupations.  
Public and private employer affirmative action programs considering the race, 
sex, and other characteristics of employees for the purpose of remedying such 
under representations are not proscribed by the statute so long as employers 
comply with the prongs and standards set out in Weber and Johnson.”). 
 155. See, e.g., David A. Harvey, A Preference for Equality:  Seeking the Benefits of 
Diversity Outside the Educational Context, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 55, 56 (2007) (“Diversity, as a 
compelling governmental interest, has only been constitutionally approved for a relatively 
brief period of an individual's life - during his or her formal education - and then only 
through preferential race-based classifications.”).  Recall that Grutter did allow preferences 
to be granted under the Diversity Spotlight Rationale in the public higher education context 
as the University of Michigan did not have a history of prior racial discrimination.  See 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that “the Equal Protection Clause 
does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to 
further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse 
student body.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Taxman v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(discussing a case where an employer who was forced to terminate one employee from its 
teaching staff terminated a white employee over an equally qualified black employee for the 
sake of diversity). 
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employment decisions based on diversity for decades.157  However, the 
overt proclamation that—even in the absence of prior discrimination—an 
employer will grant preferences to obtain a diverse workforce gained 
national prominence only recently in the Grutter case.158  In Grutter, over 
eighty prominent American businesses filed amici curiae briefs in favor of 
Michigan’s plan,159 advocated for judicial acceptance of the school’s 
forward-looking approach, and thereby, presented their version of the 
Diversity Spotlight Rationale.160  This massive support for Michigan’s 
 
 157. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of 
Respondents at 1-2, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) [hereinafter 3M 
Amici Brief] (stating that the Fortune 500 companies filing this brief:  
“have devoted substantial financial and human resources to create and maintain 
a diverse workforce. These extensive efforts are part of the very fabric of [these 
companies’] cultures, are implemented and overseen by senior managers, and 
are supported at the highest levels.  In addition, many of [these companies] 
pursue a variety of endeavors to support minority students in higher education, 
including . . . summer internship opportunities, recruiting and mentoring . . .”). 
 158. See, e.g., John E. Higgins, Grutter and Gratz Decisions Underscore Pro-Diversity 
Trends In Schools and Businesses, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J. 32, 32 (2004) (“[The] long-term 
consequences of [the Grutter decision] are yet to be determined, but talk of ‘diversity’ in all 
its many stripes, shapes, colors and hues has replaced talk about ‘affirmative action’ in the 
new, more global parlance of the Court, in our nation’s schools, and in businesses across the 
country.”). 
 159. An amicus curiae (literally “friend of the court”) brief is a filing with the Supreme 
Court – made by an individual or institution who is not a party to the case – which makes an 
argument supporting one side or one issue in a case pending before the Court.  See, e.g., 
Amicus Curiae, TECH. L.J., http://www.techlawjournal.com/glossary/legal/amicus.htm (last 
visited May 31, 2009) (presenting information from different sources which describe the 
role of amicus curiae).  The arguments made in these briefs often deal with big-picture, 
public policy issues instead of the factual record or judicial decision-making of the 
particular case.  Amici curiae briefs allow the Court to hear how a larger segment of society 
feels about the issue in a particular case in a way that the individual litigants are likely 
barred from raising as being too far from the facts.  The Supreme Court encourages the 
filing of such briefs if they are helpful in aiding the Court to make a decision.  See SUP. CT. 
R. 37(1) (stating which briefs will be acceptable to the Court). The most common filers of 
amici briefs are various advocacy groups who are not parties to the litigation at hand. 
 160. See, e.g., 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 1 (showing that the following 
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“Collectively, [the companies joining the 3M Amici Brief] have annual revenues well over a 
trillion dollars and hire thousands of graduates of the University of Michigan and other 
major public universities.”  Id.  In addition to the sixty-five companies joining the 3M Amici 
Brief, General Motors filed a separate amici brief and eighteen media companies joined 
together to file a separate brief in support of Michigan’s position.  See Brief of General 
Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) [hereinafter General Motors Amici Brief] 
(showing that General Motors supported Michigan’s position); Brief of Amici Curiae Media 
Companies in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-
241, 02-516) [hereinafter Media Companies Amici Brief]  (showing that the following 
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policy stands in stark contrast to the fifteen briefs filed on behalf of Barbara 
Grutter and against the Michigan affirmative action Plan.161 
The Diversity Spotlight Rationale is a straightforward way of stating 
that businesses desire workforce diversity merely for the sake of diversity.  
No emphasis is placed on making up for past wrongs against particular 
minority groups – whether institutional or societal.162  Business proponents 
of this rationale would not deny past discrimination, but prefer instead to 
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 161. University of Michigan:  Admissions Lawsuits, Amicus Briefs Filed with the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 
http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/ (last visited May 31, 
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 162. In fact, the words “remedial,” “remediation,” or “societal discrimination” are no 
where mentioned in the entire 3M Amici Brief.  The word discrimination only occurs once.  
See 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 7 (stating the benefits of diversity). 
 163. See 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 4 (quoting Justice Powell who discussed 
such an emphasis on the future when he stated that “it is not too much to say that the 
‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores 
of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”) (citations omitted). 
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They make the argument that future sustainability as a business entity in an 
ever-globalizing marketplace depends on the attainment of a diverse 
workforce.164  In summary, minority preference plans under the Diversity 
Spotlight Rationale are: 
1. Forward-looking and non-remedial in nature: 
 
The Diversity Spotlight Rationale is “forward-looking; it is 
decidedly not a remedial argument.  It is about making a better 
future, and not about making up for the sins of the past.”165  In 
this sense, utilization of the DSR is a relief for employers.   
Executives are no longer forced to collect information about prior 
institutional discrimination in order to justify preference plans as 
remedial.166  In the past, evidence of such discrimination was 
discoverable and available as EXHIBIT A in a Title VII 
discrimination lawsuit against the company.  Under the DSR, 
employers are free to look into the future and ponder how 
diversity and exposure to diverse people may benefit future 
leaders, executives, etc.  On the other hand, this type of non-
remedial affirmative action is relatively untested in the private 
workplace arena and is sure to generate reverse discrimination 
lawsuits as have been litigated in the educational arena.167  Part 
 
 164. See, e.g., 3M Amici Brief, supra note 154, at 1 (stating:   
“[The] existence of racial and ethnic diversity in institutions of higher education 
is vital to amici’s efforts to hire and maintain a diverse workforce, and to 
employ individuals of all backgrounds who have been educated and trained in a 
diverse environment. As explained in this brief, such a workforce is important 
to amici’s continued success in the global marketplace.”). 
 165. Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work, Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative 
Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L., 1, 14 (2005). 
 166. This evidence-gathering to justify a remedial affirmative action plan was 
problematic under the Remedial Rationale.   See, e.g., Jerome L. Epstein, Comment, 
Walking a Tightrope Without a Net:  Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans After Weber, 134 
U. PA. L. REV. 457, 474 (1986) (stating:   
“[To] immunize itself against a discrimination suit by a nonminority plaintiff, 
an employer that has enacted an affirmative action plan must satisfy Weber’s 
requirement that the plan be designed to correct ‘manifest racial imbalances in 
traditionally segregated job categories.’  Although the employer bears the 
burden of establishing the validity of its race-conscious plan, it is clear from the 
Weber Court's rejection of the Fifth Circuit majority and dissenting opinions 
that the employer cannot be required to establish its own actual past 
discrimination or arguable violations of Title VII.”) (citations omitted).   
See also Estlund, supra note 162, at 14 (“[F]ew employers have been willing either to put on 
a remedial case implying their own responsibility for the underrepresentation of people of 
color in their ranks.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 2-3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(No. 02-241) (discussing the merits of the lawsuit and stating that the “Law School . . . 
admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions.  It justifies this use of 
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IV discusses just how such a lawsuit against a private employer 
implementing a diversity-based plan might fare in front of the 
current Supreme Court. 
 
2.  Based on diversity in terms of ethnicity, race and color: 
 
The term diversity as used in the Diversity Spotlight Rationale 
generally refers to ethnicity, race, and color as opposed to gender, 
affinity, economic, experiential, or other types of characteristics 
that differentiate individuals from one another.  The 3M Amici 
Brief refers only to “ethnic and racial diversity” in its argument in 
favor of Michigan’s preference plan.168  Similarly, the General 
Motors Amici Brief disclaims that any “ruling proscribing the 
consideration of race and ethnicity in admissions decisions likely 
would dramatically reduce diversity at our Nation’s top 
institutions.”169  This is a controversial position that might rile a 
few of the current Supreme Court Justices who abhor preferences 
based on such immutable traits.170 
 
3.  Voluntary as opposed to court ordered or promulgated to 
prevent future litigation: 
 
Finally, affirmative action under the Diversity Spotlight 
Rationale is voluntary.  This means that companies choose to 
grant preferences without being compelled to do so via a court 
order.  Obviously, companies that have not discriminated in the 
past do not face legal liability and potential court-mandated 
affirmative action.  Section 703(j) of Title VII touches on 
whether such voluntary affirmative action is allowed.  This 
section states that nothing in the statute “shall be interpreted to 
require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment” to any 
group based on percentages of such group employed by the 
 
race on one ground only:  that it serves a ‘compelling interest in achieving diversity among 
its student body.’”) (citations omitted). 
 168. 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 1 (“[The] existence of racial and ethnic diversity 
in institutions of higher education is vital to amici’s efforts to hire and maintain a diverse 
workforce, and to employ individuals of all backgrounds who have been educated and 
trained in a diverse environment”) (emphasis added). 
 169. General Motors Amici Brief, supra note 160, at 2-3 (emphasis added). 
 170. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[The] Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those 
classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because 
every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the 
provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”); id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“[The] Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the 
basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception.”). 
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employer.171  This section makes it very clear that Title VII does 
not require affirmative action.  However, the majority in Weber 
distinguished required affirmative action from voluntary 
affirmative action and ruled that Title VII does not, by its express 
language, ban voluntarily implemented preference plans.172 
 In addition to defining the concept of the Diversity Spotlight Rationale 
accurately, it is important to cover the benefits of such plans from an 
employer’s standpoint.  Employer-proponents of DSR claim that such 
programs create: 
 
1)A diverse workforce necessary to compete and innovate in the 
global economy (The Global Economy Focus): 
 
The rationale underlying the Global Economy focus is that the 
twenty-first century workplace is increasingly globalized and 
therefore, increasingly diverse.  3M’s brief in Grutter reiterated 
this point in stating that the nature of American business is 
changing.  “Most of the [companies supporting the DSR] are 
truly international companies, and virtually all are becoming so . . 
. they operate and compete in a global environment, serving and 
working with people and cultures of all kinds.”173  Additionally, 
business-proponents of the DSR claim that they must be able to 
hire, train, and promote a diverse workforce—including positions 
in top management—in order to compete effectively in the global 
economy.  3M reiterated this Global Economy Focus in its 
Grutter amici brief: 
 
Because our population is diverse, and because of the 
increasingly global reach of American business, the skills and 
training needed to succeed in business today demand exposure to 
widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints.  Employees 
at every level of an organization must be able to work effectively 
with people who are different from themselves.  Amici need the 
talent and creativity of a workforce that is as diverse as the world 
around it.174 
 
Proponents of the DSR also claim that America itself is 
 
 171. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(j)(2006). 
 172. See United Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 
(1979) (reasoning that section 703(j) "does not state that ‘nothing in Title VII shall be 
interpreted to permit’ voluntary affirmative action efforts to correct racial imbalances. The 
natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious 
affirmative action.”). 
 173. 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 6-7. 
 174. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
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becoming more diverse.175  They claim that projections show that 
Asians, Blacks, Hispanics and Native Americans will comprise 
47% of the American population by the year 2050.176  With such 
statistics in mind, proponents argue that they need a diverse 
workforce not only to succeed globally but also to thrive 
nationally. 
 
2)A Diverse culture where new and innovative ideas can flourish 
(The Diversity of Ideas focus): 
 
Proponents of the DSR also claim that new and innovative ideas 
are more likely to flourish in a workforce filled with diverse 
employees.  The idea is that “a diverse group of individuals 
educated in a cross-cultural environment has the ability to 
facilitate unique and creative approaches to problem-solving 
arising from the integration of different perspectives.”177  While 
some of this exposure should come at the educational level, other 
parts will stem from the presence of a diverse workforce.  In 
addition, “individuals who have been educated in a diverse 
setting are likely to contribute to a positive work environment by 
decreasing incidents of discrimination and stereotyping.”178 
 
3)A diverse sales-force satisfying to customers (The Customer 
Preferences Focus): 
 
The third focus revolves around the argument that diversity is 
becoming ever more important in the twenty-first century global 
workplace itself.  The idea is that new employees—including 
novice managers—must understand how to deal with cultural 
differences that exist in their client, co-worker, and managerial 
relationships.  The Customer Preferences Focus argues that 
diverse individuals “are better able to develop products and 
services that appeal to a variety of consumers and to market 
offerings in ways that appeal to those consumers.”179  In addition, 
“a racially diverse group of managers with cross-cultural 
experience is better able to work with business partners, 
employees, and clientele in the United States and around the 
world.”180 
 Finally, it is important to note that the prominent companies claiming 
an interest in Michigan’s diversity-based preference plan also have a partial 
 
 175. Id. at 6. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 7. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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conflict of interest.  Every year, such businesses commit great resources 
and recruitment efforts towards Michigan and other elite schools 
throughout the country.181  According to these employers, much of their 
recruitment efforts revolve around selecting students who have been 
immersed in diverse educational environments.182  As mentioned 
previously, these businesses tie their future economic successes, at least 
partially, to the ability of the nation’s educational institutions to train 
students to handle a diverse environment. 
B. Three Key Components of a Plan under the Diversity Spotlight 
Rationale 
Because the Diversity Spotlight Rationale was approved in Grutter—
albeit narrowly within the public higher education arena—businesses such 
as 3M were confident that a similar rationale might be allowed in the 
private sector workplace.  Perhaps the best chance that these businesses 
have to insulate their diversity-based plans from the scrutiny of an anti-
affirmative action Court is to consider precedent from the key affirmative 
action cases analyzed in Part I.  This final section of Part III will utilize this 
case law to identify key components of any plan promulgated under the 
DSR.  Accordingly, plans enacted under the DSR: 
1.  Must be of limited duration and designed to attain rather than 
maintain a diverse workforce.  In general, a foundational precept 
of affirmative action is that it will end when discrimination 
disappears.  In Grutter, the University of Michigan argued that it 
would “like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions 
formula” and that it would “terminate its race-conscious 
admissions program as soon as practicable.”183  Setting a specific 
end date may not be necessary when the plan clearly states that 
its intent is to attain, rather than maintain, a diverse workforce.  
In Johnson, the Court upheld an affirmative action plan without a 
concrete end date, because it was enacted to attain rather than 
 
 181. See, e.g., id. at 8 (stating:   
“What is critical to[prominent companies] is that the leading colleges, 
universities and graduate schools from which they recruit and hire their 
employees be diverse, and consist of the most qualified and talented diverse 
students as is possible.  Universities historically have been responsive to the 
needs of business and other professions, developing an extraordinary talent pool 
upon which [these businesses] and others may draw.”). 
 182. See, e.g., 3M Amici Brief, supra note 157, at 1 (“[A]mici are global businesses that 
recruit at the University of Michigan or similar leading institutions of higher education. . . . 
[Such businesses] have a vital interest in who is admitted to our nation's colleges and 
universities, and what kind of education and training those students receive.”). 
 183. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
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maintain a diverse workforce.184  With this in mind, business 
proponents of the DSR would be ill-served by creating any 
diversity-based preference plan without acknowledging this 
precedent.  For timeframe purposes, an appropriate duration is 
likely less than or equal to the twenty-five-year period approved 
by the majority in Grutter.185  It would be even more beneficial to 
define diversity more broadly than just race and ethnicity.186  
Proponents of the DSR, however, have not chosen such a broad 
approach in the past. 
 
Both affirmative action proponents and opponents would agree 
that diverse workforces are a benefit to society.  The difference 
occurs with how such workforces are attained.  At the end of the 
“attainment” period, the hope is that the racism that does exist in 
America will diminish, and that maintaining a diverse workforce 
can be achieved solely on a merit basis. 
 
2.  Must require individualized consideration of applicants and 
employees.  The key to Michigan’s success in Grutter stemmed 
from the fact that each applicant received individualized 
consideration.187  The opposite of that is a quota or a set-aside 
 
 184. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640 (stating: 
“[S]ubstantial evidence shows that the Agency has sought to take a moderate, 
gradual approach to eliminating the imbalance in its work force, one which 
establishes realistic guidance for employment decisions, and which visits 
minimal intrusion on the legitimate expectations of other employees.  Given this 
fact, as well as the Agency's express commitment to ‘attain’ a balanced 
workforce, there is ample assurance that the Agency does not seek to use its 
Plan to ‘maintain’ a permanent racial and sexual balance.”). 
 185. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“[The majority] expect[s] that 25 years from now, the 
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved 
today.”). 
 186. See Jonathan A. Segal, Diversity:  Direct or Disguised?  Recent Supreme Court 
Decisions Don't Resolve Whether and When You Can Focus on Race in Hiring Decisions, 
H.R. MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2003, at 123, 127, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/public-
administration/administration-human/664553-1.html [hereinafter Diversity] (stating: 
”In upholding the [University of Michigan Law School’s] affirmative action 
plan, Justice O'Connor weighed heavily the fact that diversity was not limited to 
race and ethnicity but also included non-EEO factors.  As a result, employers 
should define diversity broadly to include not only EEO factors but also non-
EEO factors such as experiences, education and interests.”). 
 187. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309 (stating: 
“The Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each 
applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might 
contribute to a diverse educational environment.  There is no policy, either de 
jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single ‘soft’ 
variable.”). 
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system where applicants cannot compete for certain positions.  
Lack of such consideration was the downfall of the affirmative 
action plans in McDonald,188 Bakke,189 Gratz,190 and Parents 
Involved.191  Therefore, any preference plan promulgated under 
the DSR cannot include quotas, set-asides, or similar 
mechanisms.  Instead, such plan can consider the diversity of 
employees or applicants as plus factors in any employment or 
admissions decision.  This might bring the plan more within the 
Grutter framework approved by the Court. 
 
3.  Must not unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-minority 
employees and applicants.  Affirmative action plans can 
preference minorities but only to a certain extent.  Case law will 
allow race or ethnicity to be used as a plus factor but limits 
preference plans from “unnecessarily trammeling the rights of 
white applicants or employees.192  A recent Third Circuit decision 
struck down a voluntary affirmative action plan, in part, because 
 
 188. See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282-83 (stating: 
“Fairly read, the complaint asserted that petitioners were discharged for their 
alleged participation in a misappropriation of cargo entrusted to Santa Fe, but 
that a fellow employee, likewise implicated, was not so disciplined, and that the 
reason for the discrepancy in discipline was that the favored employee is Negro 
while petitioners are white.”). 
 189. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (stating: 
“[I]t is evident that the Davis special admissions program involves the use of an 
explicit racial classification never before countenanced by this Court.  It tells 
applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded 
from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering class.  No matter how 
strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their own 
potential for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the 
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special 
admissions seats.  At the same time, the preferred applicants have the 
opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.”). 
 190. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274 (stating: 
“The bulk of admissions decisions are executed based on selection index score 
parameters set by the [admissions committee administering the affirmative 
action policy]. . . .  Additionally, this individualized review is only provided 
after admissions counselors automatically distribute the University's version of 
a ‘plus’ that makes race a decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified 
underrepresented minority applicant.”). 
 191. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 273 (“Like the University of Michigan 
undergraduate plan struck down in Gratz, the plans here ‘do not provide for a meaningful 
individualized review of applicants’ but instead rely on racial classifications in a 
‘nonindividualized, mechanical’ way.”) (citations omitted). 
 192. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (“[The affirmative action plan in question] does not 
unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees.  The plan does not require the 
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees. Nor does the plan 
create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees . . . .) (citations omitted). 
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it unnecessarily interfered with the rights of a white employee 
who was terminated in lieu of an equally qualified black 
employee.193  Therefore, preferences promulgated under the 
Diversity Spotlight Rationale cannot lead to:  (1) the elimination 
of a white employee’s position, or (2) the restriction of 
employment opportunities for white applicants.194  Preferences 
can lead to the denial of a particular promotion or other similar 
consequences that are less serious than a termination or 
immovable ceiling on advancement. 
The incorporation of these three key components into a voluntary 
affirmative action plan will not guarantee success at the Supreme Court.  
However, omitting any of these elements is the death knell for any plan 
under the DSR.  The final substantive section of this paper evaluates 
whether an affirmative action plan promulgated under the Diversity 
Spotlight Rationale, and contains each of the three components, is likely to 
withstand a Title VII challenge under a conservative-leaning Supreme 
Court. 
IV.  THE DIVERSITY SPOTLIGHT RATIONALE BEFORE THE ROBERTS 
COURT 
Today’s Supreme Court is proving to be more conservative than the 
Rehnquist Court, which decided Grutter in 2003.195  Generally, the Justices 
 
 193. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1563-64 (3d Cir. 
1996) (stating: 
“The Board admits that it did not act to remedy the effects of past employment 
discrimination.  The parties have stipulated that neither the Board's adoption of 
its affirmative action policy nor its subsequent decision to apply it in choosing 
between Taxman and Williams was intended to remedy the results of any prior 
discrimination or identified underrepresentation of Blacks within the Piscataway 
School District's teacher workforce as a whole.  Nor does the Board contend 
that its action here was directed at remedying any de jure or de facto 
segregation.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (“[T]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of the white employees.”). 
 195. See Edward Lazarus, Under John Roberts, Court Re-Rights Itself, WASH. POST, July 
1, 2007, at B1 (“Cumulatively, the court of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. announced 
itself as even more conservative than William H. Rehnquist's court, which, from 1986 to 
2005, undercut many of the progressive initiatives from Earl Warren's era.”); Nina 
Totenberg, Supreme Court More Conservative, Fragmented, NPR, July 4, 2006, available 
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5531678 (“For the first time in 11 
years, the Supreme Court had a new membership, a new ideological makeup, and a new 
chief justice . . . .  With the departure of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the arrivals of 
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, the court shifted to the right, as 
expected.”). 
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of the Roberts Court are aligned in three quite distinct camps.196  The 
conservative block is made up of Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin 
Scalia, Samuel Alito, and Chief Justice John Roberts.197  The liberal block 
is made up of Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, retiring 
Justice David Souter, and Steven Breyer.198  Although no one can predict 
future political alliances on the Court, it appears likely that Souter’s likely 
replacement, Justice Sonia Sotomayer,199 will join this liberal block rather 
than create a one-Justice, liberal-leaning swing vote.200  The third camp-–
 
 196. See Editorial, The Roberts Court Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, at 11, 11 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30/opinion/30sun1.html (“There are three 
hardened camps:  four very conservative justices, four liberals, and a moderate conservative, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, hovering in between.”). 
 197. See id. (“[I]n reality Chief Justice Roberts quickly settled into a bloc with his fellow 
conservatives Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.”); Daphne Eviatar, Next 
President to Reshape Court, WASH. INDEP., Sept. 12, 2008, available at 
http://washingtonindependent.com/5745/next-president-to-reshape-supreme%20court (“If 
you add one more Scalia or Thomas or Roberts or Alito to this bench, you’ve got a very 
hard 5-person conservative majority.”). 
 198. See Maria Godoy, Parsing the High Court’s Ruling on Race and Schools, NPR, 
June 28, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11659428 
(discussing the votes in Parents Involved and stating that “Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a 
dissent that was joined by the court's three other liberal justices [Stevens, Ginsburg and 
Souter]”). 
 199. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in 
Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayer to the United States Supreme Court, White House, May 
26, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-
President-in-Nominating-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-Supreme-Court/ 
(“After completing this exhaustive process [of searching for a nominee to replace Justice 
Souter], I have decided to nominate an inspiring woman who I believe will make a great 
justice:  Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the great state of New York.”). 
 200. See Jess Bravin and Nathan Koppel, Record Shows Rulings Within Liberal 
Mainstream, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124338260937756559.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (stating: 
“Judge Sonia Sotomayor has built a record on such issues as civil rights and 
employment law that puts her within the mainstream of Democratic judicial 
appointees. . . . Judge Sotomayor would be succeeding Justice David Souter, 
generally a liberal vote on social issues, and her selection isn't likely to change 
the outcome on cases where the Supreme Court typically splits 5-4.”).   
But see Kevin Russell, Where Would Justice Souter’s Replacement Make a Difference?  
Part I, SCOTUSBLOG, May 27, 2009, [hereinafter Difference Part I] available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/where-would-justice-souter%e2%80%99s-replacement-
make-a-difference-part-i/#more-9642 (analyzing recent cases “where it is at least possible 
that [Justice Souter’s] likely successor, Judge Sotomayor, might vote differently”).  Justice 
Souter has proven to be a reliable liberal vote.  In fact, since Justice Alito joined the Court 
for the 2005 term, Justice Souter has only joined the current conservative majority seven 
times even though he was appointed by a conservative president.  See Kevin Russell, Where 
Would Justice Souter’s Replacement Make a Difference?  Part II, SCOTUSBLOG, May 29, 
2009, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/where-would-justice-
souter%E2%80%99s-replacement-make-a-difference-part-ii/ (stating that there have been 
seven cases since 2005 where Justice Souter sided with Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices 
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one best categorized as conservative-leaning-–is composed of Justice 
Anthony Kennedy.201  Statistics from the 2007 term show that nineteen 
cases produced split five to four decisions on political lines; Justice 
Kennedy sided with the conservative 
At the same time, the Court is clearly becoming more ideologically 
divided.  While the “Rehnquist Court had its share of divided rulings . . . 
the new conservative ascendancy has prompted a striking reaction from the 
dissenting liberals, John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
and Stephen Breyer.”202  These days, members of the liberal block are:  (1) 
filing unified dissenting opinions and (2) bucking the tradition of merely 
filing dissents and, instead, reading their opinions aloud from the bench.203  
This bitter divide has become prominent in the affirmative action arena, as 
well, stemming most recently from the controversial five to four decision in 
the Parents Involved case.204 
 
Ginsburg, Kenney, and Alito).  It is also fair to assume that the Obama Administration will 
nominate an appointee at least as liberal as Souter had become upon his retirement.  See 
Difference Part I (“One would predicate that—at least on hot-button issues, like abortion 
and affirmative action—the President would not have nominated Judge Sotomayor unless he 
were fairly confident that she would vote consistently with Justice Souter’s liberal-leaning 
record.”).  It appears very likely that a liberal nominee will take Justice Souter’s seat on the 
Court for the 2009-2010 term. 
 201. See Robert Barnes, In Second Term, Roberts Court Defines Itself - Many 5 to 4 
Decisions Reflect Narrowly Split Court That Leans Conservative, WASH. POST, June 25, 
2007, at A3, A3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/24/AR2007062401367.html (“Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the 
only member of the court to be in the majority in all 16 of this term's 5 to 4 decisions, has 
sided more consistently with conservatives in recently announced cases.”); Laura Smith-
Spark, US Supreme Court’s Swing to the Right, BBC NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7021922.stm (discussing the current Court’s swing to 
the right and stating that: 
“[the] [k]ey to that will be the actions of Justice Anthony Kennedy, most often 
the swing voter on the court.  In the 2006 session, of 19 cases that divided 5-4 
along ideological lines, the conservative block won 13 and the liberal block six - 
and almost every time, Mr. Kennedy's was the deciding vote.”);  
Jeffrey Toobin, Editorial, Five to Four, NEW YORKER, June 25, 2007, at 35, 35, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2007/06/25/070625taco_talk_toobin [hereinafter 
Five to Four] (“Kennedy holds the balance of power in the Roberts Court, much the way 
Sandra Day O’Connor did in the Rehnquist years.  Kennedy is more conservative than 
O’Connor, so the Court is, too.”). 
 202. Five to Four, supra note 201, at 36. 
 203. See, e.g., Roberts Barnes, Supreme Court Leans Conservative, WASH. POST, June 
25, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/25/AR2007062501047.html (“[The] liberal justices have 
responded in unified dissents to amplify their unhappiness . . . .  And the term may well be 
remembered for the normally modest Ginsburg's decision to buck tradition and read dissents 
twice from the bench.”). 
 204. See, e.g., Bill Mears, Divided Court Rejects School Diversity Plans, CNN, June 28, 
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/06/28/scotus.race/index.html (“[A] bitterly divided 
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A. Changes on the Court and the Potential Impact on Affirmative Action 
At the end of the day, the replacement of conservative Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist with conservative Chief Justice John Roberts did not 
alter the Court’s stance on affirmative action.   Both Rehnquist and Roberts 
issued opinions firmly against the practice, especially with preferences 
justified by something akin to the Diversity Spotlight Rationale.205  A more 
important change—the appointment of Justice Samuel Alito to replace 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—has likely decreased support on the Court 
for affirmative action.  As discussed in Part II, Justice O’Connor proved to 
be the pivotal fifth vote in the Grutter decision.206  It was O’Connor’s 
opinion that allowed the forward-looking use of preferences to foster a 
diverse student body.  The evidence indicates that Justice Alito would not 
have voted on O’Connor’s side in Grutter.  For example, prominent interest 
groups challenged Alito’s nomination stating that the: 
[M]ost recent claim against Judge Alito is that his advocacy 
record before the Supreme Court during his tenure in the Reagan-
administration solicitor general’s office shows that he’s to the 
extreme right of Justice O’Connor, particularly on matters 
 
U.S. Supreme Court . . . issued what is likely to be a landmark opinion - ruling that race 
cannot be a factor in the assignment of children to public schools.”).  As discussed in Part I, 
the conservative block plus Justice Kennedy voted to strike down the plan. The liberal block 
would have upheld it.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. District No. 
1, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_908 (last visited May 29, 
2009) (showing the votes of the Justices in this case in pictorial form). 
 205. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378-79 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing 
Michigan’s non-remedial affirmative action plan and stating that: 
“I agree with the Court that, ‘in the limited circumstance when drawing racial 
distinctions is permissible,’ the government must ensure that its means are 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.  I do not believe, 
however, that the University of Michigan Law School's . . . means are narrowly 
tailored to the interest it asserts. The Law School claims it must take the steps it 
does to achieve a "'critical mass'" of underrepresented minority students.  But its 
actual program bears no relation to this asserted goal. Stripped of its "critical 
mass" veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve 
racial balancing.”);  
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (discussing a non-remedial affirmative action plan and 
stating that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race.”). 
 206. Justice O’Connor provided the swing vote when she joined the liberal block of the 
Court to form a majority in Grutter.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), 
OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_241/ (showing the votes of the 
Justices in this case in pictorial form and indicating that Justice O’Connor voted in favor of 
the diversity-based, voluntary affirmative action plan).  But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244 (2003), OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_516/ (showing that 
Justice O’Connor voted with the conservative majority in striking down the forward-
looking, voluntary affirmative action plan in Gratz). 
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pertaining to affirmative action.  For example, People for the 
American Way declares “Alito’s record strongly suggests that if 
he had been on the Court instead of O’Connor, affirmative action 
by government institutions would have been completely 
prohibited instead of being preserved.”  The NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund maintains that “During [Justice O’Connor’s] long 
tenure on the Court, she has cast significant votes in many 
decisions to uphold affirmative action.”  And the National 
Congress of Black Women contends that “If he is confirmed to 
replace Justice O’Connor, Judge Alito will almost certainly, 
based upon his past performance, shift the current 5-4 balance on 
the court on affirmative action.”207 
This evidence indicates that the Alito-for-O’Connor substitution is 
material - at least pertaining to affirmative action.  In fact, the predictions 
made below would likely be very different with O’Connor still on the 
Court.  There is evidence from her Grutter opinion that she might have 
voted to extend the majority’s reasoning into the private workplace arena.  
In Grutter, O’Connor made it a point to “dispel the notion that the Law 
School's argument has been foreclosed, either expressly or implicitly, by 
our affirmative-action cases decided since Bakke.  It is true that some 
language in those opinions might be read to suggest that remedying past 
discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-based 
governmental action . . . .  But we have never held that the only 
governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past 
discrimination.”208  To make this leap from government action to private, 
voluntary preferences, O’Connor might have argued that the scrutiny 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment is less rigid under Title VII and 
that the Court should defer to the expertise of the executives promulgating 
DSR plans.209  She might then have picked up on Justice Brennan’s 
reasoning in Weber and claimed that nothing in Title VII states that the 
Remedial Rationale is the only legal justification for preferences.210  As 
interesting as this tangent is, however, the remaining sections of this paper 
will deal with the Court as it is currently composed. 
B. The Diversity Spotlight Rationale before the Current Supreme Court 
The following analysis predicts the likely decision of a conservative-
 
 207. Peter Kirsanow, Alito Accuracy, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Jan. 6, 2006, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/kirsanow200601060712.asp. 
 208. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
 209. See id. (stating also that the “Law School's educational judgment that such diversity 
is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”). 
 210. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (“[The majority] need not today define in detail the line of 
demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans.”). 
CIOCCHETTIFINALIZED_ONE 3/31/2010  1:59:33 AM 
332 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
leaning Supreme Court (minus O’Connor, plus Alito) when confronted 
with a diversity-based preference plan under the Diversity Spotlight 
Rationale.  More specifically, the goal is to predict how each Justice might 
analyze a voluntary affirmative action plan crafted by a private company 
for the sole purpose of attaining a diverse workforce.  The discussion 
assumes that:  (1) such a plan will be evaluated under the history and 
precedent analyzed in Part I and (2) the positions of the Justices have not 
materially changed since their last affirmative action decisions and public 
comments on the topic. 
(1) The Liberal Block 
The Justices of the liberal block would likely uphold a preference-
based plan under the Diversity Spotlight Rationale against a Title VII 
challenge.  This section discusses the rationale for each of the four Justices 
included in this camp. 
Since joining the Court in 1993, Justice Ginsburg has been pro-
affirmative action, whether the type promoted by the government under the 
Remedial Rationale in Adarand or the Diversity Spotlight Rationale in 
Gratz, Grutter, and Parents Involved.   Ginsburg’s passion about the topic 
led her to pen separate dissents in two of the three cases where the Court 
struck down an affirmative action plan on her watch.  She did so in 
Adarand rather mildly, suggesting that the Court defer to Congress’ 
institutional competence to overcome the discrimination of the past and 
stating that: 
The divisions in this difficult case should not obscure the Court's 
recognition of the persistence of racial inequality and a majority's 
acknowledgment of Congress' authority to act affirmatively, not 
only to end discrimination, but also to counteract discrimination's 
lingering effects . . . .  Those effects, reflective of a system of 
racial caste only recently ended, are evident in our workplaces, 
markets, and neighborhoods.”211 
She did so in Gratz more forcefully, focusing on the theme of 
continuing and persistent racial discrimination in America and stating the 
following: 
[Educational institutions are not barred from any and all 
consideration of race when making admissions decisions . . . .  
[The Court’s] insistence on "consistency," would be fitting were 
our Nation free of the vestiges of rank discrimination long 
reinforced by law. . . . But we are not far distant from an overtly 
discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned 
 
 211. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 273 (citations omitted). 
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inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and 
schools.”212 
Justice Ginsburg more easily accepts the “benign” discrimination 
promoted by the Diversity Spotlight Rationale as long as it does not 
“trammel unduly upon the opportunities of others or interfere too harshly 
with legitimate expectations of persons in once-preferred groups.”213  She is 
also likely to defer to the expertise of the executives promulgating the plans 
as she did in Adarand.  As for race-based preferences outside of a remedial 
context, while on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Ginsburg stated, “[f]urther, in his separate opinion in Croson, Justice 
Stevens reasoned, and I agree, that remedy for past wrong is not the 
exclusive basis upon which racial classification may be justified.”214  It 
appears that Justice Ginsburg would likely uphold a preference-based plan 
justified by the Diversity Spotlight Rationale when challenged under Title 
VII. 
Justice Breyer’s position on affirmative action was clarified in a recent 
speech he gave at a Stanford University diversity conference.  Breyer 
claimed that the majority opinion he joined in Grutter was the most 
important decision since his appointment to the Court.215  Breyer stated that 
he believed that Michigan’s “affirmative action policies were sound efforts 
to level the playing field for disadvantaged minorities . . . [but] followed 
that remark with the admonition that he doesn't believe that all affirmative 
action efforts are right.”216  Of all the Justices forming the liberal block, 
Breyer is the most likely to jump ship and strike down a preference plan 
under the DSR.  However, this appears unlikely for three key reasons.  
First, Justice Breyer views “benign” discrimination as more constitutionally 
acceptable than invidious discrimination.217  In a recent speech he stated 
 
 212. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (citations omitted) (stating:   
“[The] stain of generations of racial oppression is still visible in our society . . . 
and the determination to hasten its removal remains vital. One can reasonably 
anticipate, therefore, that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their 
minority enrollment-and the networks and opportunities thereby opened to 
minority graduates-whether or not they can do so in full candor through 
adoption of affirmative action plans of the kind here at issue.  Without recourse 
to such plans, institutions of higher education may resort to camouflage.”). 
 213. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302. 
 214. O’Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia. 963 F.2d 420, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating also that Judge Ginsburg concurred with the majority in 
this case “with the understanding, made clear by Croson, that minority preference programs 
are not per se offensive to equal protection principles, nor need they be confined solely to 
the redress of state-sponsored discrimination.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 215. Ray Delgado, Breyer Says Affirmative Action Case Was His “Most Important,” 
STAN. REP., May 5, 2004, http://news.stanford.edu/news/2004/may5/breyer-55.html. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281-82 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment but not 
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that: 
There’s a difference between positive and negative 
discrimination; there’s a difference between affirmative action 
and invidious discrimination . . . .  The reason there’s a legal 
difference is that it flows from a view of the 14th Amendment 
that says, ‘What’s it there for? What did these people have in 
mind? What were they trying to do?’ And they would have seen 
it . . . as trying to give a helping hand rather than a kick in the 
face.”218 
Preference plans under the Diversity Spotlight Rationale can be 
considered a form of benign discrimination favoring minorities.  Second, 
his dissent in Parents Involved stated that courts should apply strict 
scrutiny, even to benign discrimination, but also that the Court can defer to 
the experts when it comes to improving their programs.219  Finally, Justice 
Breyer has voted to support race-based preferences in each of the four 
prominent affirmative action cases he has presided over since joining the 
Court in 1994220 and at least two times as an appellate judge.221  Therefore, 
 
the opinion and dissenting in part) (“I agree with Justice Ginsburg that, in implementing the 
Constitution’s equality instruction, government decision makers may properly distinguish 
between policies of inclusion and exclusion . . . for the former are more likely to prove 
consistent with the basic constitutional obligation that the law respect each individual 
equally.”). 
 218. Lauren Henry & Andrew Mangino, Breyer Weighs In on Constitution, Politics, 
YALE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2006, available at 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/17882. 
 219. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 866 (stating:   
“And what of respect for democratic local decision-making by States and school 
boards? For several decades this Court has rested its public school decisions 
upon [the] basic view that the Constitution grants local school districts a 
significant degree of leeway where the inclusive use of race-conscious criteria is 
at issue. Now localities will have to cope with the difficult problems they face 
(including resegregation) deprived of one means they may find necessary.”) 
(citations omitted).   
He also stated that “a longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority tells us that the 
Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve 
positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel it.”  Id. 
 220. See Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz, 
539 U.S. 244 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment but not the opinion) (showing that 
Justice Breyer only concurred because he wanted to reiterate Justice O’Connor’s view of the 
constitutionality of government-sponsored preference plans); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 
702, 574 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 221. See, e.g., Breyer’s Civil Liberties Record:  ACLU Finds Centrist, Practical Judge, 
LECTLAW, July 5, 1994, http://www.lectlaw.com/files/jud02.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) 
(stating: 
“Judge Breyer has twice upheld the Boston Police Department's affirmative 
action efforts against legal challenge.  In the first case, he rejected the argument 
that a voluntary affirmative action plan must be limited to the actual victims of 
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Justice Breyer would likely uphold a preference-based plan justified by the 
Diversity Spotlight Rationale when challenged under Title VII. 
Justice Sotomayer, assuming a successful confirmation, appears to be 
a proponent of affirmative action.  The press is reporting that: 
Judge Sotomayor, whose parents moved to New York from 
Puerto Rico, has championed the importance of considering race 
and ethnicity in admissions, hiring and even judicial selection at 
almost every stage of her career:  as a student activist at 
Princeton and at Yale Law School, as a board member of left-
leaning Hispanic advocacy groups and as a federal judge arguing 
for diversity on the bench.222 
As for her recent judicial record, as part of a three-judge Second 
Circuit panel, Sotomayor voted to uphold a district court decision allowing 
the City of New Haven to avoid certifying the results of promotional 
examination.223  The City chose this path because no African-Americans 
and only one Hispanic firefighter qualified for promotion based on the 
exam and it wanted to avoid a potential discrimination lawsuit under Title 
VII.224  Sotomayer’s panel rejected a reverse discrimination claim under 
Title VII by a white applicant/test-taker who likely would have received a 
promotion had the test been certified.225  In doing so, the panel stated that: 
[I]t simply does not follow that [the white plaintiff] has a viable 
Title VII claim.  To the contrary, because the Board, in refusing 
to validate the exams, was simply trying to fulfill its obligations 
under Title VII when confronted with test results that had a 
disproportionate racial impact, its actions were protected.226 
 
past discrimination.  In the second case, he ruled against a constitutional claim 
of reverse discrimination raised by white police officers.”). 
 222. David D. Kirkpatrick, Sotomayer’s Focus on Race Issues May be Hurdle, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/us/politics/30affirm.html. 
 223. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating: 
“[New Haven] found itself in the unfortunate position of having no good 
alternatives.  We are not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs' expression of 
frustration.  Mr. Ricci, for example, who is dyslexic, made intensive efforts that 
appear to have resulted in his scoring highly on one of the exams, only to have 
it invalidated. But it simply does not follow that he has a viable Title VII claim.  
To the contrary, because the Board, in refusing to validate the exams, was 
simply trying to fulfill its obligations under Title VII when confronted with test 
results that had a disproportionate racial impact, its actions were protected.”).   
In June 2008, Judge Sotomayer was part of a seven to six majority, which refused to allow a 
rehearing en banc by the entire Second Circuit.  Id.  The case made its way to the Supreme 
Court styled as Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 87 (stating:   
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This sort of language indicates that Judge Sotomayer would likely 
uphold a preference-based plan justified by the Diversity Spotlight 
Rationale when challenged under Title VII. 
Finally, Justice Stevens appears to be solidly in the pro-affirmative 
action camp.  This was not always the case as, early in his career on the 
Court, Stevens joined the unanimous decision against the racial preferences 
under Title VII in McDonald227 and claimed that the Constitution was 
colorblind in Bakke.228  Stevens also claimed in a recent speech that he 
would have joined Rehnquist’s dissent in Weber had he not been 
disqualified from the case.229  Today, however, his views on affirmative 
action have changed and it is likely that he would vote to uphold a 
voluntary, diversity-based workplace preference plan under the Diversity 
Spotlight Rationale.  He made this position clear in a dissenting opinion 
issued in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.230  In Wygant, a public 
board-of-education crafted a preference plan whereby minority teachers 
could avoid certain lay-offs regardless of seniority.231  The majority held 
that the plan was not narrowly tailored enough to survive scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and struck it down.232  Justice Stevens disagreed 
 
“[T]he Civil Service Board found itself in the unfortunate position of having no 
good alternatives. We are not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs' expression of 
frustration. Mr. Ricci, for example, who is dyslexic, made intensive efforts that 
appear to have resulted in his scoring highly on one of the exams, only to have 
it invalidated.”). 
 227. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 274. 
 228. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 418 (“[T]he meaning of the Title VI ban on exclusion is 
crystal clear:  Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally 
funded program.”). 
 229. See Fordham University School of Law Centennial Conference, Justice John P. 
Stevens, Remarks at Fordham University School of Law Centennial Conference:  Learning 
on the Job, 13-14, Sept. 30, 2005, available at http://law.fordham.edu/newsfiles/news-
stevens.pdf [hereinafter Stevens’ Remarks] (stating that he still agrees with Rehnquist’s 
interpretation of the legislative history undergirding Title VII but, since Congress has 
acquiesced in the holding of Weber, he is bound by precedent to uphold subsequent similar 
cases) 
 230. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 231. Id. at 270-71 (detailing the agreement between the board and the union which stated 
that:   
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers 
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority 
in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a greater 
percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of 
minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the 
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than the number of positions 
to be eliminated. Each teacher so affected will be called back in reverse order 
for position for which he is certificated maintaining the above minority 
balance."). 
 232. Id. at 283-84. 
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and advocated for an early form of the Diversity Spotlight Rationale: 
In my opinion, it is not necessary to find that the Board of 
Education has been guilty of racial discrimination in the past to 
support the conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in 
employing more black teachers in the future.  Rather than 
analyzing a case of this kind by asking whether minority teachers 
have some sort of special entitlement to jobs as a remedy for sins 
that were committed in the past, I believe that we should first ask 
whether the Board's action advances the public interest in 
educating children for the future.  If so, I believe we should 
consider whether that public interest, and the manner in which it 
is pursued, justifies any adverse effects on the disadvantaged 
group.233 
Stevens honed in on whether the preferences produced some 
legitimate public purpose.234  If they did, the procedures used to implement 
the preferences must be fair and the public purpose musts transcend the 
nature of the harm to non-preferenced individuals.235  If the preference plan 
passes this test, it is constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Stevens also made the argument that benign discrimination is much 
different under the Equal Protection Clause than invidious 
discrimination.236  Stevens reiterated his support for forward-looking 
affirmative action in a concurrence in Croson although he voted to strike 
down the preference plan at issue.237  Since Croson, Stevens has voted to 
 
 233. Id. at 313. 
 234. See id. at 315 (“[In Wygant] the collective bargaining agreement between the Union 
and the Board of Education succinctly stated a valid public purpose.”). 
 235. See id. at 317 (stating that even if there is a valid purpose: 
“to the race consciousness, however, the question that remains is whether that 
public purpose transcends the harm to the white teachers who are disadvantaged 
by the special preference the Board has given to its most recently hired minority 
teachers. In my view, there are two important inquiries in assessing the harm to 
the disadvantaged teacher. The first is an assessment of the procedures that were 
used to adopt, and implement, the race-conscious action. The second is an 
evaluation of the nature of the harm itself.”). 
 236. See id. at 316 (stating that:   
“[an] inclusionary decision [i.e., benign discrimination] is consistent with the 
principle that all men are created equal; the exclusionary decision [i.e., 
invidious discrimination] is at war with that principle. One decision accords 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the other does 
not. Thus, consideration of whether the consciousness of race is exclusionary or 
inclusionary plainly distinguishes the Board's valid purpose in this case from a 
race-conscious decision that would reinforce assumptions of inequality.”). 
 237. See Weber, 448 U.S. at 511, 545 (stating: 
“[A] central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to further the national 
goal of equal opportunity for all our citizens. In order to achieve that goal, we 
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uphold preference-based affirmative action plans in Adarand, Grutter, 
Gratz and Parents Involved.  At the end of the day, Stevens believes that 
“we have learned that there is a critical difference between using race as a 
criterion for hiring when the race of the employee is not directly related to 
the objectives of the employer . . . and recognizing its relevance in law 
enforcement and educational contexts.”238  With all of this evidence 
considered, Justice Stevens would likely uphold a preference-based plan 
justified by the Diversity Spotlight Rationale when challenged under Title 
VII. 
(2) The Conservative Block 
An analysis of the conservative block is much easier than an analysis 
of the liberal block or of Justice Kennedy.  This is because the conservative 
Justices are not shy about their opinions against almost all forms of 
affirmative action.  For example, Justice Antonin Scalia has made his 
position on racial preferences crystal clear:  “To pursue the concept of 
racial entitlement-even for the most admirable and benign of purposes-is to 
reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that 
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred.  In the eyes of 
government, we are just one race here.  It is American.”239  Along these 
same lines, Scalia feels that Weber should be overruled.240  In a dissent in 
Johnson, Scalia stated that the 
Court today completes the process of converting this from a 
guarantee that race or sex will not be the basis for employment 
determinations to a guarantee that it often will.  Ever so subtly, 
without even alluding to the last obstacles preserved by earlier 
opinions that we now push out of our path, we effectively replace 
the goal of a discrimination-free society with the quite 
incompatible goal of proportionate representation by race and by 
sex in the workplace.241 
In Grutter, he stated that the “Constitution proscribes government 
 
must learn from our past mistakes, but I believe the Constitution requires us to 
evaluate our policy decisions—including those that govern the relationships 
among different racial and ethnic groups—primarily by studying their probable 
impact on the future. I therefore do not agree with the premise that seems to 
underlie today's decision . . . that a governmental decision that rests on a racial 
classification is never permissible except as a remedy for a past wrong.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 238. Stevens’ Remarks, supra note 229, at 14-15. 
 239. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 240. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 241. Id. at 658 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no 
exception.”242  Justice Scalia is skeptical of courts remedying societal 
discrimination243 and believes that the Equal Protection Clause protects 
individuals and, therefore, one individual cannot be injured even to assist 
an entire group of minorities.244 
When it comes to a workplace affirmative action plan under the DSR, 
Scalia is likely to hold that prohibitions against discrimination in Title VII 
are as strict as those prohibited by the Constitution.245  He also calls into 
question the motives of some of the businesses that file amici briefs in 
affirmative action cases.  Scalia has expressed his belief by stating that it is 
less costly for employers to argue for preference plans in the courts as 
amici so that they can hire less qualified workers and avoid the costs of 
Title VII racial discrimination lawsuits brought by minorities who can 
prove institutional discrimination.246  With such strong statements on the 
record, Justice Scalia is nearly certain to strike down a preference-based 
plan justified by the Diversity Spotlight Rationale when challenged under 
Title VII. 
Justice Thomas believes that the “government may not make 
distinctions on the basis of race.  As far as the Constitution is concerned, it 
is irrelevant whether a government's racial classifications are drawn by 
those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to 
help those thought to be disadvantaged.”247  Justice Thomas has said that 
strict scrutiny applies to any government classification on the basis of race 
and it is likely that his scrutiny will be fatal regardless of whether the 
preferences are benign or invidious.248  He has said:  “In my mind, 
government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is 
 
 242. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 243. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
 244. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 245. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[While] Mr. Johnson does not 
advance a constitutional claim here, it is most unlikely that Title VII was intended to place a 
lesser restraint on discrimination by public actors than is established by the Constitution.”). 
 246. See id. at 677 (stating that the Johnson majority opinion will not:   
“displease the world of corporate and governmental employers (many of whom 
have filed briefs as amici in the present case, all on the side of Santa Clara) for 
whom the cost of hiring less qualified workers is often substantially less--and 
infinitely more predictable--than the cost of litigating Title VII cases and of 
seeking to convince federal agencies by non-numerical means that no 
discrimination exists.”). 
 247. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 248. See id. at 240-41 (explaining that strict scrutiny applies to all government 
classifications based on race and good intentions on the part of the government will not 
provide it refuge). 
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just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice.  In each 
instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.”249  This will likely 
doom the benign racial preferences in play under the DSR - even though it 
is a private employer rather than the government executing the preferences.  
In addition, Justice Thomas’ record is solidly against affirmative action, 
having dissented from the judgment in Grutter250 and joined with the 
opinion of the Court in Gratz and Parents Involved.  With these steadfast 
and long-held positions, Justice Thomas is nearly certain to strike down a 
preference-based plan justified by the Diversity Spotlight Rationale when 
challenged under Title VII. 
Justices Roberts and Alito have not made their positions on 
affirmative action as clear as Justices Scalia and Thomas.  They did, 
however, join with Scalia and Thomas in striking down the race-based 
preference plan in Parents Involved.251  Chief Justice Roberts made a strong 
anti-affirmative action statement in Parents Involved, writing that the “way 
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the 
basis of race.”252  He rejected the argument that benign classifications on 
the basis of race should receive lighter scrutiny than invidious 
classifications and stated that the “argument that different rules should 
govern racial classifications designed to include rather than exclude is not 
new; it has been repeatedly pressed in the past . . . and has been repeatedly 
rejected.”253  Additionally, the Chief Justice does not appear to be a big fan 
of deference to decision-makers in the context of affirmative action.  He 
rebutted Justice Breyer’s claim that the Court should defer to the expertise 
of the local school boards by stating that such “deference ‘is fundamentally 
at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence.  We put the burden on 
state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified.'”254  
An important part of the DSR is the dereference granted to company 
 
 249. Id. at 241. 
 250. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting from the 
judgment) (stating:   
“[the Court] in an unprecedented display of deference under our strict scrutiny 
analysis, upholds the Law School's program despite its obvious flaws.  We have 
said that when it comes to the use of race, the connection between the ends and 
the means used to attain them must be precise. But here the flaw is deeper than 
that; it is not merely a question of ‘fit’ between ends and means. Here the means 
actually used are forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution.”). 
 251. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 708 (announcing the Justices forming the 
majority/plurality of the Court). 
 252. Id. at 748. 
 253. Id. at 743 (“Simply because the school districts may seek a worthy goal does not 
mean they are free to discriminate on the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial 
classifications should be subject to less exacting scrutiny.”). 
 254. Id. at 744 (citing Johnson 534 U.S. at 506). 
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executives to determine what constitutes the most effective and profitable 
workforce. 
Similarly, Justice Alito joined Roberts’ opinion in Parents Involved in 
its entirety.  More telling is that, as a judge on the Third Circuit, he joined 
an opinion in a case styled Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township 
of Piscataway.255  The issue in this extremely relevant case was whether 
“Title VII permits an employer with a racially balanced work force to grant 
a non-remedial racial preference in order to promote 'racial diversity'".256  
This issue is directly on-point to the challenge that will eventually be made 
under the DSR.257  Then-Judge Alito joined a majority of eight Third 
Circuit judges to strike down this preference plan.  The court used the 
Weber and Johnson standards detailed in Part II above and found that Title 
VII relevant caselaw “convinces us that a non-remedial affirmative action 
plan cannot form the basis for deviating from the antidiscrimination 
mandate of Title VII.”258  In the end, the Third Circuit concluded: 
While we have rejected the argument that the Board's non-
remedial application of the affirmative action policy is consistent 
with the language and intent of Title VII, we do not reject in 
principle the diversity goal articulated by the Board.  Indeed, we 
recognize that the differences among us underlie the richness and 
strength of our Nation.  Our disposition of this matter, however, 
rests squarely on the foundation of Title VII.  Although we 
applaud the goal of racial diversity, we cannot agree that Title 
VII permits an employer to advance that goal through non-
remedial discriminatory measures.259 
This is a strong statement against the DSR as applied to Title VII.  It is 
also the primary Circuit Court case law on point.  The Supreme Court 
nearly granted certiorari in this case but it was settled at the last minute.  
Interestingly, various civil rights groups paid most of the settlement money 
to avoid a potential bad result in the Supreme Court – an action that 
foreshadows the predications made in this paper.260  Therefore, based on the 
 
 255. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1547. 
 256. Id. at 1549. 
 257. The only difference lies in the fact that the preferences in Taxman were crafted by a 
public employer and this article anticipates a Supreme Court challenge against a private 
employer based on the amici briefs in Grutter. 
 258. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1563. 
 259. Id. at 1567. 
 260. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Financial Details are Revealed in Affirmative Action 
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 6, 1997, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/06/nyregion/financial-details-are-revealed-in-affirmative-
action-settlement.html (stating:   
“[The] coalition, in a highly unusual move, offered last month to pay most of 
the $433,500 settlement to Sharon Taxman, a white teacher at Piscataway High 
School whom the board had dismissed in a 1989 budget reduction to preserve a 
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evidence above, it appears that both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
would strike down a preference-based plan justified by the Diversity 
Spotlight Rationale when challenged under Title VII. 
(3) Justice Kennedy 
This may indeed be the era of the Kennedy Court instead of the 
Roberts Court.261  Anthony Kennedy currently presides as the decisive vote 
between two camps of Justices each seeking to form a majority.  Although 
he votes with the conservative block more often than not, Justice Kennedy 
often writes separately “to moderate the result.”262  When it comes to 
affirmative action, Kennedy has stated that a racial preference, “when 
resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive of all policies, containing 
within it the potential to destroy confidence in the Constitution and in the 
idea of equality.”263  He has also opined that to “make race matter now so 
that it might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to 
overcome.”264 
However, Justice Kennedy does believe that racial preferences can be 
constitutional, but only in “one context” – to foster student diversity in the 
public educational arena.265  In this particular context, Kennedy requires 
governmental preferences to undergo a strict scrutiny analysis to meet the 
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.266  This adherence to strict 
 
black teacher's job.”).  “The abrupt settlement, on Nov. 21, ended the eight-
year-old case against the school board just two months before it was scheduled 
to be heard by the United States Supreme Court. Civil rights leaders offered to 
help finance the settlement because they feared the Supreme Court would use 
the case to strike down almost all affirmative action programs.”  Id. 
 261. David Cole, The “Kennedy Court,” THE NATION. July 14, 2006, 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060731/cole [hereinafter Kennedy Court].  But see Linda 
Greenhouse, At Supreme Court, 5-4 Rulings Fade, But Why?, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/23/us/23memo.html?_r=1 (“[Justice 
Kennedy’s] dominance last term was so complete that, of 68 decisions, he cast only two 
dissenting votes. He has already dissented five times [during the 2007-2008] term. So have 
Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr., Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul Stevens. In other words, no 
longer the essential justice, Anthony Kennedy now looks like just one of the pack.”). 
 262. Kennedy Court, supra note 261.  See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 263. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 264. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782. 
 265. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 266. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that:   
Powell’s Bakke opinion “is based on the principle that a university admissions 
program may take account of race as one, non-predominant factor in a system 
designed to consider each applicant as an individual, provided the program can 
meet the test of strict scrutiny by the judiciary. This is a unitary formulation. If 
strict scrutiny is abandoned or manipulated to distort its real and accepted 
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scrutiny is what caused Kennedy to dissent in Grutter267 and join the Court 
in striking down affirmative action plans in Gratz268 and Parents 
Involved269 (albeit with a more moderate concurrence).270  Each of those 
three cases had diversity as the justification for the affirmative action plans 
in controversy.  The primary difference between Grutter, Gratz and 
Parents Involved and a future workplace preference plan is the one thing 
that matters most to Kennedy – the special context of the educational arena. 
Today, it appears that Kennedy’s position on race-based preferences 
has not changed drastically.  A recent exchange from oral arguments in 
Ricci v. DeStefano indicates that he is still skeptical of racial classifications 
by the government which take away opportunities from non-preferenced 
individuals: 
 
JUSTICE KENNEDY:  Counsel, [the employer city that failed to 
certify the test] looked at the results, and it classified the 
successful and unsuccessful applicants by race. 
 
 
meaning, the Court lacks authority to approve the use of race even in this 
modest, limited way. The opinion by Justice Powell, in my view, states the 
correct rule for resolving this case. The Court, however, does not apply strict 
scrutiny.”). 
 267. Id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[The] Court, however, does not apply strict 
scrutiny. By trying to say otherwise, it undermines both the test and its own controlling 
precedents.”). 
 268. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (joining the majority opinion which stated that: 
“[t]o withstand our strict scrutiny analysis, respondents must demonstrate that 
the University's use of race in its current admissions program employs 
‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.’  
Because ‘[r]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the 
most exact connection between justification and classification,’ . . . our review 
of whether such requirements have been met must entail ‘'a most searching 
examination.’”  We find that the University's policy, which automatically 
distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, 
to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of race, is 
not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that 
respondents claim justifies their program.”) (citations omitted). 
 269. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[As the Seattle] 
district fails to account for the classification system it has chosen, despite what appears to be 
its ill fit, Seattle has not shown its plan to be narrowly tailored to achieve its own ends; and 
thus it fails to pass strict scrutiny.”). 
 270. Id. at 782 (stating: 
“I agree with The Chief Justice that we have jurisdiction to decide the cases 
before us and join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. I also join Parts III-A 
and III-C for reasons provided below. My views do not allow me to join the 
balance of the opinion by The Chief Justice, which seems to me to be 
inconsistent in both its approach and its implications with the history, meaning, 
and reach of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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MR. KNEEDLER:  It -- it-- 
 
JUSTICE KENNEDY:  And then -- and you want us to say this isn't 
race? I have -- I have trouble with this argument. 
 
MR. KNEEDLER:  No, with respect, it did not classify according to 
race; it looked in general terms.  It did not have the names of 
individual people.  It looked in general terms at what the racial 
disparity of the test was.  It just – 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  It didn't look at names; it just looked at 
the label of what their race was.  That's all they were concerned 
about. 
 
MR. KNEEDLER:  Title VII's disparate impact test requires -- 
requires an employer to be aware of and respond – 
 
JUSTICE KENNEDY:  But that's inconsistent with your answer to 
the Chief Justice who was exploring whether or not what we have 
here is a -- is a racial criteria, pure and simple, and you say, well, 
it's general.  And then we point out that each applicant didn't 
have his name, but they had his or her race. 271 
This back and forth—picked up on by the conservative Chief 
Justice—is reminiscent of Kennedy’s concurrence in Croson where he 
stated that the “moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of 
the Equal Protection Clause.”272  When it comes to such classifications, 
Kennedy’s concurrences in general appear to favor the use of race only as a 
last resort.  He would instead encourage affirmative action proponents to 
strive to promote diversity by non-referential means.  Although Kennedy 
was not on the Court for the Weber and Johnson, the evidence indicates 
that he will likely limit his approval of affirmative action to the educational 
arena – the “one context” he deems it legitimate.  This means that Justice 
Kennedy would likely strike down a preference-based plan justified by the 
Diversity Spotlight Rationale when challenged under Title VII. 
 
 271. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39-40, Ricci v. DeStefano, Apr. 22, 2009, (Nos. 07-
1428, 08-328), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-1428.pdf.  It 
appeared that Justice Kennedy “seemed troubled by the city's decision to throw out all 
results of a promotion exam only after officials learned that no African-American candidates 
had scored high enough to be promoted.”  Warren Richey, Reverse-Discrimination Case 
Splits Supreme Court, C.S. MONITOR, Apr. 22, 2009, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0423/p02s01-usju.html%20. 
 272. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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(4) The Votes 
Considering precedent, prior public statements of the current Justices 
and the potential conflict between the DSR and the express language of 
Title VII – it is likely that a voluntary, diversity-based workplace 
affirmative action plan will be struck down by the current Court.273  This 
paper predicts a five to four split decision with the conservative block and 
the conservative-leaning Justice Kennedy in the majority.  This paper also 
predicts the issuance of strong and passionate dissenting opinions from the 
liberal block. 
The majority opinion might utilize any or each of the following 
reasons to limit Grutter to the academic context:  (1) the workplace is much 
different from the academic environment where academic freedom might 
allow racial and gender preferences to attain a diverse student body of 
future leaders; (2) taking away opportunities under the Diversity Spotlight 
Rationale is not as compelling as doing so under the Remedial Rationale—
especially in the business context where diversity is utilized in part increase 
profits; and (3) Title VII was enacted to eliminate racial discrimination of 
any type—including so-called reverse discrimination against white 
employees and applicants and the language of the statute makes this 
mandate expressly clear.  To justify this result, the Court might dispense 
with the Weber and Johnson tests and, instead, import the strict scrutiny 
test from the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection cases to its Title VII 
analysis of the DSR.  This option would not require Justice Kennedy to 
overrule Weber or Johnson – he could merely limit those holdings to 
workplace preferences justified by the Remedial Rationale. 
In summary, the following chart predicts the particular votes of the 
current Justices in the hypothetical case of DSR preference program 





 273. See also Jonathan A. Segal, Diversity: 
 Direct or Disguised? Recent Supreme Court Decisions Don't Resolve whether and when 
you Can Focus on Race in Hiring Decisions, H.R. MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2003, at 1, available 
at http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/administration-human/664553-1.html 
(stating: 
“[Some] commentators believe these ground-breaking decisions [Grutter and 
Gratz], which generally recognize the importance of student-body diversity in 
public higher education, provide a green light for employers to consider race 
and ethnicity for the purpose of achieving a diverse workforce.  However, such 
an interpretation is probably a mistake. Nothing in the court's opinions . . . 
expressly protects consideration of race, ethnicity or other protected 
classifications in the private employment context.”). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has decided only a dozen prominent cases on the 
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topic of affirmative action.274 The impact of each decision, however, has 
profoundly shaped public policy and societal expectations.  Few topics 
generate such passion and controversy within academia, business, 
government, the legal profession and the social sciences – not to mention 
among the citizenry and the press.275  The paper demonstrates that the 
affirmative action of our parents will not be the affirmative action of our 
children.  What is significantly different today is that the justification for 
preference plans has changed drastically from backward-looking to 
forward-looking.  The Remedial Rationale is fading into history and the 
Diversity Spotlight Rationale is emerging as the new frontier. 
In the private workplace arena, prominent businesses now claim an 
interest in fostering diversity within their ranks to better compete, market 
and think in an ever-globalizing economy.  Diversity Spotlight Rationale-
based arguments such as these butt heads with the express language and 
anti-discriminatory thrust of Title VII and with affirmative action 
opponents.  This article predicts that the current Supreme Court will side 
with a strict statutory interpretation of Title VII and strike down a 
voluntary, forward-looking, diversity-based workplace affirmative action 
plan.  This prediction is based on Justice Kennedy’s general anti-
affirmative action stance, a conservative-learning Court and the written 
positions staked out by Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito, Roberts and 
Kennedy (i.e., the dissents in Grutter, the majority opinions in Gratz and 
Parents Involved and Justice Alito’s vote in Taxman).  Casey Stengel 
warned that people should “never make predictions, especially about the 
 
 274. See, e.g., Supreme Court Collection:  Topic:  Affirmative Action, CORNELL UNIV. 
LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cases/topics/tog_affirmative_action.html 
(linking to twelve Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action) and Timeline of 
Affirmative Action Milestones, INFOPLEASE, 
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/affirmativetimeline1.html (last visited May 30, 2009) 
(presenting a timeline of key affirmative action decisions from the Supreme Court). 
 275. See, e.g., Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Conflicted Views of 
Affirmative Action,  May 14, 2003, available at http://people-
press.org/report/184/conflicted-views-of-affirmative-action (stating:   
“[A] new Pew Research Center nationwide survey finds a growing majority of 
the public supporting the general idea of affirmative action. But the poll results 
also reflect the public's complicated and sometimes contradictory attitudes 
about the subject.  There is support for the rationale of affirmative action  such 
as overcoming past discrimination or increasing the diversity of students in 
college. But at the same time, Americans question the fairness of such 
programs, the rationale notwithstanding.  When the details of specific 
affirmative action programs are raised, public reservations increase. Further, 
when people are questioned about programs involving preferential treatment for 
minorities, opinion turns negative. On all questions about affirmative action 
there are predictable racial differences in opinion, but significant gender 
differences are evident as well, even when the issue of gender inequality is not 
mentioned in the question.”) 
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future.”276  This statement is partially true in the sense that predicting 
Supreme Court opinions—especially those of Justice Kennedy—can be 
dicey.277  Only time will tell how the current Court will handle the first 
affirmative action case coming from the private workplace under the 
Diversity Spotlight Rationale.  However, one fact is clear – nearly one 
hundred prominent American businesses stated unabashedly in Grutter that 
they support and may create forward-looking preference plans based solely 
on diversity for the sake of diversity.  The seriousness of this fact makes 
predictive papers such as this an important part of the discussion. 
As this Diversity Spotlight Rationale gains prominence in the 
workplace, it is only a matter of time before a white employee loses an 
employment opportunity and brings a reverse discrimination lawsuit.  The 
controversial nature of forward-looking, diversity-based preference plans 
combined with the history of circuit splits regarding affirmative action 
should provide compelling reasons278 for the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari upon appeal.279  In generating a decision, the Justices have two 
 
 276. See, e.g., “Famous Quotes about Predictions,” QUOTESDADDY, 
http://www.quotesdaddy.com/quote/153924/casey-stengel/never-make-predictions-
especially-about-the-future (last visited May 31, 2009). 
 277. See, e.g., Associated Press, DeLay Slams Supreme Court Justice Kennedy, MSNBC, 
Apr. 20, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7550959/ (“[Although Justice 
Kennedy] was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Reagan, a conservative icon, he 
has aroused conservatives’ ire by sometimes agreeing with the court’s more liberal 
members.”). 
 278. The Supreme Court has discretion to grant or deny certiorari under Rule 10 of the 
Rule of the Supreme Court.  CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI, 
SUP. CT. R. 10, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/supct/10.html (last visited May 
31, 2009) (“[Review] on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. 
A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.”). 
 279. Id. at 10(a) and 10(c) (stating: 
“In granting certiorari, the Court is likely to look to:  (a) [whether] a United 
States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of 
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter . . . and/or 
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important 
question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or 
has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant 
decisions of this Court.”).   
The Third Circuit has held that Title VII does not allow for workplace affirmative action 
plans justified by the DSR.  Taxman v. Bd. of Ed. of the Twp of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 
1563 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that “[o]ur analysis of the statute and the caselaw convinces us 
that a non-remedial affirmative action plan cannot form the basis for deviating from the 
antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII.”).  There is a strong chance that a least one of the 
other twelve circuit courts of appeals will rule differently – as they have for decades in the 
affirmative action area.  See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, No-Good Lazy Justices, SLATE, July 15, 
2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2103909/ (“[W]e live with circuit splits all the time. It felt 
like the circuits were split over affirmative action for about a million years. The Supreme 
Court eventually takes these cases and resolves them, as is its mandate.”).  This will create 
the circuit split that the Justices can use as a compelling reason for granting certiorari.  
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primary options:  (1) restrain the reach of Grutter and limit Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion to the public higher education arena or (2) expand the 
DSR as legitimate under Title VII within the private workplace arena.  
Although this paper predicts that the current conservative-leaning Court 
will opt for option (1), there is little doubt that the Diversity Spotlight 
Rationale has taken its place at the frontier of affirmative action 
jurisprudence.  Even if the Court strikes down an early DSR program, 
employers and interest groups will continue to tweak their plans seeking 
judicial approval.  Additionally, the public policy and public opinion battle 
revolving around affirmative action is sure to continue before and after the 





Additionally, the Diversity Spotlight Rationale under Title VII and its clear anti-
discrimination mandate is certainly an important question of federal law that has not been 
settled by the Supreme Court.  This provides a compelling reason for a grant of certiorari. 
